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Abstract: Systemic racism in the United States is pervasive. It runs through 
every aspect of society, from healthcare to education. Changing all of the parts 
of society touched by racism is necessary, however, this Article does not 
provide a cure for systemic racism. It seeks to address a byproduct of this 
racism: police brutality. Over and over, headlines broadcast the deaths of Black 
Americans at the hands of the police – why has nothing changed? This Article 
argues that meaningful reform requires trust in U.S. law enforcement, which 
can only be achieved by holding police accountable and deterring misconduct. 
To do so, this Article proposes meaningful and forceful police licensing to 
guarantee more third-party, unbiased oversight. 
 “Change has been too slow and we have to have greater sense of urgency about 
[police reform].”1- President Barack Obama 
 “We can never be satisfied as long as the Negro is the victim of the unspeakable 
horrors of police brutality”2- Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
INTRODUCTION 
____________________________________________________________ 
*Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar Boston College Law School. 
**J.D. Candidate 2021 and teaching assistant for Introduction to Criminal Justice, Boston 
College Law School. 
 
1 President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Deaths of Alton Sterling and 
Philando Castille (Jul. 7, 2016).  
2 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., “I Have A Dream” Speech at the March on Washington for Jobs 
and Freedom (Aug. 28, 1963). 
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Racism in the United States is and always has been systemic; from 
housing to healthcare, racism permeates all parts of U.S. society.3 In its 1968 
report, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, colloquially 
referred to as the Kerner Commission, determined that “white society is 
deeply implicated in the ghetto…White institutions created it, white 
institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.”4 For the entire history 
of this country, white society’s role in discrimination against Black 
Americans has been clear. Some improvements have been made but certainly 
not enough. In 1985, the U.S. Government released the “Report of the 
Secretary’s Task Force on Black and Minority Health,” which determined 
that inequities in healthcare were responsible for 60,000 deaths per year in 
the United States.5 Today, Black women are three times more likely to die in 
childbirth than white women.6 In addition, the 2020 COVID-19 crisis has 
revealed further racial inequities in the healthcare system.7 Black people in 
the United States are three times more likely to be infected by the coronavirus 
than white people; in addition, Black individuals are almost two-times as 
likely to die from COVID-19 than white individuals.8 These racial 
differences exist in big cities, like New York City, and suburban areas, such 
as Fairfax County, Virginia.9 
____________________________________________________________ 
3 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (describing the systemic racism permeating American society); 
Joe R. Feagin & Bernice McNair Barnett, Success and Failure: How Systemic Racism Trumped the 
Brown v. Board of Education Decision, U. ILL. L. REV. 1099 (2004) (providing an overview of 
systemic racism in American schools and other parts of society); Kimberly Gill, Housing 
Discrimination in Detroit: An Example of Systemic Racism, CLICK ON DETROIT (last updated Jun. 
24, 2020), https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2020/06/24/housing-discrimination-in-
detroit-an-example-of-systemic-racism/ (explaining the impact of systemic housing discrimination 
in the city of Detroit following the passage of the Fair Housing Act). 
4 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968). 
5 J. Nadine Gracia, Remembering Margaret Heckler’s Commitment to Advancing Minority 
Health, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181115.296624/full/.  
6 Roni Caryn Rabin, Huge Racial Disparities Found in Deaths Linked to Pregnancy, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/health/pregnancy-deaths-
.html?searchResultPosition=1. White women die during childbirth at a rate of 13 per every 100,000 
births. Id. In contrast, Black women die at a rate of 42.8 per every 100,000 births. Id.  
7 Richard A. Oppel Jr., et al., The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jul. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-
african-americans-cdc-data.html.  
8 Id. In addition, Latinx individuals were also three times more likely to be infected by the 
coronavirus than white individuals. Id.  
9 Id.  
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Disparities do not only exist in healthcare.10 In 1934, Congress 
passed the National Housing Act, offering government mortgages to those in 
good financial standing – so long as they were white.11 In the 1960s, Congress 
passed the Fair Housing Act, which aimed to right the wrongs done to Black 
Americans under the National Housing Act; unfortunately, segregation and 
disparities still exist today in U.S. housing.12 Because the Fair Housing Act 
failed to actually fix the segregation of neighborhoods and other forms of 
racial control evolved, today housing is still significantly segregated, 
perpetuating racial inequities and oppression.13 Although legal segregation 
has ended, discriminatory zoning and mortgage lending practices, 
“redlining,” and other racially discriminatory practices still exist.14 
Remnants of segregation still implicate education in the United 
States, even after many believed Brown v. Board of Education fixed the 
system. Today, approximately two-thirds of minority children learn in 
schools that serve a majority minority student body.15 Since most public 
schools are funded by property taxes, schools in poorer locales with a 
____________________________________________________________ 
10 See Gill, supra note 3 (explaining the racial disparities in housing in Detroit, Michigan).  
11 Id.  
12Id.; see also Deborah Kenn, Institutionalized, Legal Racism: Housing Segregation and 
Beyond, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 39–41 (2001) (arguing that Congress’s attempts to fix the 
housing disparities in the United States only served to perpetuate the problem).  
13 See Kenn, supra note 12, at 40–41 (suggesting that although legal segregation and 
discrimination is no longer allowed in the United States today, informal modes of racial 
discrimination and segregation exist and contribute to inequities).  
14 See id. (providing an overview of modern practices that discriminate against Black 
Americans in the housing market). “Redlining” refers to the practice of denying mortgages to 
individuals regardless of finances, typically Black Americans in U.S. cities, and marking the areas 
where these individuals lived as zones not to lend to. See Khristopher J. Brooks, Redlinging’s 
Legacy: Maps are Gone, but the Problem Hasn’t Disappeared, CBS NEWS (Jun. 12, 2020), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/redlining-what-is-history-mike-bloomberg-comments/. These 
areas were marked with a red pen, hence “redlining,” to demonstrate which areas in a particular city 
were considered riskier to lend to; typically, these risky communities were home to many Black 
Americans. Id. Although redlining was made illegal in the Fair Housing Act, little has been done to 
rectify redlining’s implications, leaving many cities segregated on racial lines. Kenn, supra note 12, 
at 39–41. Further, there is evidence that the practice of redlining may still exist in the United States 
– in 2018, a study of 31 million records found that there was a significant pattern of people of color 
being denied loans in major cities, such as Atlanta, Detroit, and Philadelphia. See Aaron Glantz & 
Emmanuel Martinez, For People of Color, Banks are Shutting the Door to Homeownership, 
REVEAL NEWS (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.revealnews.org/article/for-people-of-color-banks-are-
shutting-the-door-to-homeownership/. The study determined that Black individuals were refused 
loans at rates significantly higher than white individuals in forty-eight cities. Id.  
15 Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTE (Mar. 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unequal-opportunity-race-and-
education/.  
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majority of students of color have less resources “on every tangible measure,” 
including quality of teachers and range of courses offered.16 
Racism is a systemic issue; however, this Article will only focus on 
one aspect – how racism intersects with policing.17 Prior to the Civil War, 
police departments, which often had their roots in slave patrols, sprung up 
across the United States.18 Police departments were born to maintain control 
over Black Americans, and remnants of this initial practice remain in policing 
today.19   
Following the Civil War, Congress ratified the Thirteenth 
Amendment to cement the abolition of slavery in the United States; although 
slavery was abandoned privately, the Thirteenth Amendment allows 
involuntary servitude  “as a punishment for crime,” creating a loophole for 
slavery in prisons.20Despite the promise of freedom within the Thirteenth 
Amendment, following its ratification Black Americans faced extreme 
marginalization and systemic inequities.21 A number of states seeking to 
replace slavery enacted new laws, known today as “Black Codes.”22 
Although proponents of these laws thought of them as mere criminal statutes, 
they were “poorly disguised substitutes for slavery,” criminalizing Black 
Americans that attempted to work in certain jobs, restricted where Black 
____________________________________________________________ 
16 Id.; see also Sarah Jones, Did America Set Public Schools Up to Fail?, N.Y. MAG. (Jul. 27, 
2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/07/the-triple-crisis-facing-americas-public-
schools.html (explaining the way schools are funded in the United States, primarily via local 
property taxes, which contributes to inequality).  Minority children are less likely than white 
children to receive any of the critical school resources tied to later success, including small classes, 
better teachers, smaller student bodies where teachers know individual students, and rigorous 
coursework. See Darling-Hammond, supra note15.  
17 Infra Part I; Part II. 
18André Douglas Pond Cummings, Reforming Policing, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 573, 578–79 
(2018).  
19 Id. Scholars have uncovered a clear link between the control of Black Americans and the 
original goals of U.S. law enforcement: “[T]he literature clearly establishes that a legally sanctioned 
law enforcement system existed in America…for the express purpose of controlling the slave 
population…The similarities between the slave patrols and modern American policing are too 
salient to dismiss or ignore…the slave patrol should be considered a forerunner of modern American 
law enforcement.” Id. 
20 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; David S. Bogen, From Racial Discrimination to Separate but 
Equal: The Common Law Impact of the Thirteenth Amendment, 38 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 117, 117 
(2011) (describing the birth of the Thirteenth Amendment).   
21History.com Editors, Jim Crow Laws, HISTORY.COM (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.history.com/topics/early-20th-century-us/jim-crow-laws.  
22 See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 672–73 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (explaining the history of Black Codes in the United States).   
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Americans could live, required Black Americans to treat white people with 
deference, and more.23 Importantly, police officers enforced these laws and 
others, including vagrancy laws, which granted police officers wide 
discretion to arrest individuals for vague crimes of loitering and being 
“suspicious.”24 Black individuals found guilty of violating a Black Code or 
vagrancy law found themselves on chain gangs, paying fines, or serving as 
an unpaid servant on a white-owned plantation.25 Although tasked with 
protecting all Americans, police officers largely turned a blind eye to the 
violence Black Americans faced from the Ku Klux Klan and other white 
terrorist groups.26 
Today, Black Americans unfortunately face many similar problems with 
the police as they did following the Civil War and during the Civil Rights 
Movement. Black Americans are three times more likely to be killed by 
police officers than white Americans.27In response to both the systemic racial 
inequities in the United States and the disproportionate number of Black 
Americans who die at the hands of the police, in 2013, following 17-year old 
Trayvon Martin’s death at the hands of police, the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) 
movement was created.28Although the impetus for the movement was the 
____________________________________________________________ 
23 Id. at 672–73. Black Codes also made it illegal for Black Americans to own weapons, 
“required proof of residence,” and “prohibited the congregation of groups of [Black Americans].” 
Id. One particularly disturbing Black Code allowed white families to “take-in” Black orphans or 
Black children from Black families deemed unfit to care for their children. Mikah K. Thompson, A 
Culture of Silence: Exploring the Impact of the Historically Contentious Relationship Between 
African-Americans and the Police, 85 UMKC L. REV. 697, 718–19 (2017) [hereinafter A Culture 
of Silence]. When these white families took the Black children, they typically were placed in an 
“apprenticeship,” which comprised of unpaid labor, without parental consent and with “corporal 
chastisement.” Id. 
24 See Cummings, supra note 18, at 581–82 (describing how police officers played a role in the 
oppression of Black Americans); see also Risa L. Goluboff, Before Black Lives Matter, SLATE (Mar. 
2, 2016), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/03/vagrancy-laws-and-the-legacy-of-the-civil-
rights-movement.html (explaining the history of vagrancy laws in the United States and the way 
police used these statutes to arrest anyone they disagreed with or found problematic).  
25 A Culture of Silence, supra note 23, at 718–19. 
26 See id. at 719–20 (summarizing the history of police violence against Black Americans). 
27 Laura Bult, A Timeline of 1,944 Black Americans Killed by Police, VOX (Jun. 30, 2020), 
https://www.vox.com/2020/6/30/21306843/black-police-killings. 
28 See Linda S. Greene, et al., Talking About Black Lives Matter and #METOO, 34 WIS. J.L. 
GENDER & SOC’Y 109, 110–11 (2019) (recounting the beginning of the Black Lives Matter 
movement). Black Lives Matter, as an organization, is comprised of at least thirty chapters globally. 
Id. at 121. As a movement, Black Lives Matter refers to “a broad conceptual umbrella that refers to 
the important work of a wide range of liberation organizations.” Id. BLM defines its work in the 
following words: “By combating and countering acts of violence, creating space for Black 
imagination and innovation, and centering Black joy, we are winning immediate improvements in 
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shooting of Black Americans by the police, the movement gained traction from 
the indignities and injustices  and all the examples of systemic racism. Since 
2013, BLM has used its large, international platform to raise awareness of 
injustices occurring across the United States, including the murders at the 
hands of police of Eric Garner in New York in 2014, Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri in 2014, Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio in 2014, Freddie 
Gray in Baltimore, Maryland in 2015, and most recently, George Floyd in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota and Breonna Taylor in Louisville, Kentucky in 2020.29 
In the wake of the 2020 BLM movement, people across the globe have 
called for reform of police practices and, more broadly, systemic racism.30 
Reforms range from banning chokeholds to completely dismantling and 
defunding American police departments.31 Although most of these reforms are 
needed and may improve policing practices, more must be done to actually 
deter the police and create trust of law enforcement in minority communities. 
____________________________________________________________ 
our lives.” About, BLACK LIVES MATTER (last visited Jul. 13, 2020), 
https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/. Importantly, BLM stresses that BLM aims to ensure justice for 
all Black lives, including “Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, undocumented folks, folks 
with records, women, and all Black lives along the gender spectrum.” Id. One scholar notes that the 
death of Trayvon Martin and the trial of his killer, Michael Zimmerman, which resulted in an 
acquittal, was a “turning point” in the BLM movement. Mark S. Brodin, The Murder of Black Males 
in a World of Non-Accountability: The Surreal Trial of George Zimmerman for the Killing of 
Trayvon Martin, 59 HOW. L.J. 765, 767 (2016). Furthermore, there are clear parallels between 
Trayvon Martin’s death and the subsequent BLM movement and the infamous murder of Emmet 
Till, a young Black teen, in 1955, which arguably helped spark the Civil Rights Movement. Id.  
 
29 Monica Anderson, The Hashtag #BlackLivesMatter Emerges: Social Activism on Twitter, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2016/08/15/the-
hashtag-blacklivesmatter-emerges-social-activism-on-twitter/ (demonstrating spikes in social 
conversation using #BlackLivesMatter surrounding the deaths of Black individuals at the hands of 
police); see also Alia E. Dastagir, George Floyd. Ahmaud Arbery. Breonna Taylor. What do we Tell 
Our Children?, USA TODAY (last updated Jun. 11, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/31/how-talk-kids-racism-racial-violence-
police-brutality/5288065002/. In addition to raising awareness regarding the deaths of Black 
Americans at the hands of the police, the 2020 movement also responded to the murder of 25-year-
old Ahmaud Arbery, an unarmed Black man killed by white men while jogging in Georgia. Jason 
Slotkin, After Ahmaud Arbery’s Killing, Georgia Governor Signs Hate Crimes Legislation, NPR 
(Jun. 26, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-
justice/2020/06/26/884003927/after-ahmaud-arberys-killing-georgia-gov-signs-hate-crimes-
legislation. 
30 See Jon Emont & Philip Wen, How Protests Over George Floyd’s Killing Spread Around 
the World, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-helps-spur-
global-protests-over-george-floyds-death-11591880851.  (emphasizing the global impact of the 
2020 BLM movement).  
31 See infra Part III (providing an overview of some newly implemented reforms attempting to 
stop police brutality in the United States). 
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This Article will review many of the reforms various cities and states have tried 
to address the problem of police brutality; in addition, this Article will suggest 
that meaningful reform requires police deterrence.32 To accomplish this, it is 
imperative that neutral and detached adjudicatory bodies are able to punish and 
hold police officers accountable.33  
 Part I will look at the current state of policing in the United States.34 We 
will look at the myriad of factors inherent in most police forces that has allowed 
bad police officers to thrive.35 Part II will provide an overview of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence that has not only failed  to reign in police but has indeed 
encouraged bad acts.36 Part III will explain that popular reforms, such as 
banning chokeholds and requiring body-cameras, are insufficient to deter 
police because they do not shift the power of police accountability to an 
unbiased, third-party.37 Part IV will argue that meaningful reform requires 
cultivating trust in policing by mandating police licensing and granting 
licensing bodies considerable power to decertify officers.38 In addition we will 
argue for less interaction between the police and citizenry, through 
decriminalization of petty crime.39 Ultimately, this Article summarizes the 
challenges in obtaining meaningful police reform, and identifies viable 
solutions to the complex problem. 
I. POLICE CULTURE: SYSTEMS THAT SUPPORT POLICE MISCONDUCT & 
BRUTALITY 
 In 1991, a bystander, using his camcorder, captured the brutal beating 
of Rodney King by four police officers from the Los Angeles Police 
Department.40 Although approximately twenty law enforcement officials were 
____________________________________________________________ 
32 See infra Part IV.  
33 See infra Part IV. 
34 See infra Part I. 
35 See infra Part I. 
36 See infra Part II. 
37 See infra Part III. 
38 See infra Part IV. 
39 See infra Part IV. 
40 See Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The 
Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 516 (1993) (recounting the details of 
Rodney King’s brutal beating at the hands of the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”)). 
During the course of the assault, King was beat more than fifty-three times and was kicked seven times. 
Id. In addition, King was shot with a Taser, an electrical shock gun, as many as three times. Michael 
Fleeman, King Beating Focuses Attention on Police Taser, Nightstick, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 29, 
Even page # Journal Name [Issue 
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present at the beating, none of the officers intervened or submitted a report 
detailing the beating.41 Had the video not existed, it would be difficult for 
Rodney King to be believed, given the contrary testimony of the officers.42 The 
advent of iPhones and videos has documented what has been the culture of 
brutality in police departments, particularly against Black Americans, a 
constant in U.S. society since law enforcement’s inception prior to the Civil 
War. The BLM movement was reignited in 2020 by the widely circulated and 
deeply disturbing nearly nine-minute video of George Floyd’s killing.43 With 
the continued documentation of  police brutally toward Black Americans– why 
has nothing changed?44    
There are at least 18,000 different police departments in the United 
States with no central oversight; the following describes what is common to 
most police departments.45 Although most police officers are committed to 
civil service, those that do not follow the rules often overshadow the efforts of 
“good” cops. Furthermore, the structure and culture of police departments in 
the United States protect the bad actors. Imagine an apple tree. Most of the 
apples that grow from the trunk are good, however, the rotten apples also grow 
____________________________________________________________ 
1991), https://apnews.com/b0c4c38f03f76a4f0c65c218998612d4. The taser carried a “50,000-volt 
electrical charge.” Id. 
41 Levenson, supra note 40, at 520.  
42 See Jim Newton, Opinion, Rodney King’s Beating Provides a Road Map for Investigating 
Police Misconduct, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 11, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-06-
11/rodney-king-police-misconduct-investigations (describing the Rodney King beating and the 
police officer’s decision to not file a report of misconduct).  
43 See Larry Buchanan, et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-
protests-crowd-size.html (analyzing data of protestor turnout at BLM demonstrations across the 
United States and determining that the numbers indicated the biggest movement in U.S. history). 
As one scholar stated, “If you aren’t moved by the George Floyd video, you have nothing in you.” 
Id. (quoting Professor Daniel Q. Gillion of the University of Pennsylvania, who has published works 
on demonstrations and U.S. politics). The video was shared widely across social media platforms, 
including Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter. Emont & Wen, supra note 30. Individuals across the 
globe were struck by the brutality the police inflicted upon George Floyd. Id. As one women in 
Wales stated, “[s]eeing someone die brought me to reality.” Id. Seeing the video led this woman to 
organize her own rally in Wales, which she promoted through her social media channels. Id. 
44 See Corinthia A. Carter, Note, Police Brutality, The Law & Today’s Social Justice 
Movement: How the Lack of Police Accountability Has Fueled Hashtag Activism, 20 CUNY L. REV. 
521, 522–23 (2017) (describing the impact the sharing of videos of police brutality have had on the 
BLM movement). 
45 Leandra Bernstein, America has 18,000 Police Agencies, No National Standards; Experts ay 
That’s a Problem, WJLA (Jun. 9, 2020), https://wjla.com/news/nation-world/america-has-18000-
police-agencies-no-national-standards-experts-say-thats-a-problem. 
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and are allowed to thrive because of support from the trunk. The trunk allows 
bad actors to thrive and fails to hold problematic police officers accountable.  
 Law enforcement is shaped by the institution’s structure; “[i]t is the 
culture of ‘us’—the brave warriors—against ‘them’—the rabble of the 
street.”46 Rather than seeing people in their communities as constituents to 
protect, the police perceive themselves as “under siege.”47This mentality gives 
birth to what some scholars call an officer’s “working personality.”48 Working 
as a police officer naturally separates individuals from the community.49 Then, 
when an officer does meet the public, he or she is always going to be in 
charge.50 As a result, police officers tend to have a feeling of authority and 
solidarity with other officers.51 In addition, officers on street patrol tend to be 
the low end of the hierarchical structure; unlike other business structures, like 
in the legal profession, these low-level officers have a great deal of discretion.52 
Although solidarity within a profession may seem like a positive outcome 
of time spent in the workplace, in law enforcement it can have a more sinister 
effect.53 Known colloquially as “the Blue Wall of Silence,” the solidarity police 
officers form often leads to a refusal to testify against fellow officers in court, 
____________________________________________________________ 
46 See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483, 554–55 (2006) (describing the culture within 
police departments that perpetuates a culture of “us vs. them”). 
47 Id.  
48 See Aviva Twersky Glasner, Police Personality: What is it and Why are They Like That?, 20 
J. OF POLICE & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 56, 63 (2005) (recounting the attributes of the police officer’s 
“working personality,” which is formed after joining police culture). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 79 (1973). As Wilson notes, most 
organizations structure themselves so that “the lowest-ranking members perform the most routinized 
tasks and discretion…increases with rank.” Id. Police departments, in contrast, give the most 
discretion to street patrol officers, the lowest ranking, who are asked to make split-second decisions 
regarding citizen behavior. See id. (comparing the responsibilities given to low-level police officers 
to responsibilities of low-level factory-workers, who may repeat the same exact task many times 
per day without any discretionary responsibilities).  
53 See Jennifer E. Koepke, Note, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling 
of Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 212–14 (2000) (telling the story of 
Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant who suffered a brutal attack at the hands of New York police, 
and explaining that officers in the precinct refused to testify against each other); see also Marie 
Brenner, Incident in the 70th Precinct, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/1997/12/louima199712 (recounting the horrific details of the 
brutal assault upon Abner Louima). 
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and protection of each other at all costs. 54 As early as 1931, the Wickersham 
Commission stated “It is an unwritten law in police departments that police 
officers must never testify against their brother officers.”55The code of silence 
may even lead officers to perjure themselves at suppression hearings to ensure 
evidence stays in, regardless of the means by which it was obtained.56 Recall 
that the  Rodney King tape, in 1992, showed about twenty police officers who 
not only did not intervene but never reported what they saw.57 Another 
example, occurring in 2018 in Chicago, involved the killing of 17-year-old 
Laquan McDonald by Officer Jason Van Dyke.58 Van Dyke and other officers 
on the squad had stated McDonald attacked them with a knife prior to Van 
Dyke opening fire; one year later, dash-cam video revealed that McDonald was 
____________________________________________________________ 
54 See Koepke, supra note 53, at 212–14 (emphasizing the insidious nature of the Blue Wall of 
Silence). One particularly disturbing example of the implications of the Blue Wall of Silence is the 
Abner Louima police brutality case. Id. On August 9, 1997, New York Police Department 
(“NYPD”) officers brutally sodomized Abner Louima, a Black Haitian immigrant, in the bathroom 
of the NYPD 70th Precinct. Beth Fertig & Jim O’Grady, Twenty Years Later: The Police Assault on 
Abner Louima and What it Means, WNYC News (Aug. 9, 2017) 
https://www.wnyc.org/story/twenty-years-later-look-back-nypd-assault-abner-louima-and-what-it-
means-today/. Louima was arrested after one officer, Volpe, thought he punched him during a street 
fight outside a club; this was later found to be an incorrect identification. Id. Following his brutal 
assault, Louima had significant surgeries on his organs and stayed in the hospital for two months. 
Id. The police union, and Volpe’s fellow officers, defended him to uphold the blue wall of silence. 
Id. During an investigation of the precinct following the brutal incident, investigators discovered 
that many officers had staunchly refused to help with the prosecution of officers involved. Koepke, 
supra note 53, at 212–13. Further, those that eventually decided to participate only agreed after the 
prosecutor pressured them with criminal charges. Id. During the investigation, approximately 100 
police officers were offered immunity in exchange for information; of those 100, only two were 
willing to break the blue wall of silence. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of 
Silence” as Evidence of the Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 
233, 242–44 (1998).  Following the officers’ decision to come forward with information, the city 
put the officers’ families under a 24/7 watch to guard against potential retaliation from the NYPD. 
Id. More broadly, two investigations, the Mollen Commission in New York and the Christopher 
Commission in Los Angeles, found significant evidence of a “code of silence” within the departments. 
Chin & Wells, supra note 54, at 240. The Christopher Commission, appointed following the brutal 
Rodney King beating, determined that the blue wall of silence was “perhaps the greatest single 
barrier to effective investigation and adjudication of complaints” brought against Los Angeles 
Police Department officers. Id. 
55 William Finnegan, How Police Unions Fight Reform, NEW YORKER (Jul. 27, 2020), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/03/how-police-unions-fight-reform (quoting 
Wickersham Commission, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931)). 
56 Chin & Wells, supra note 54, at 238. 
57 See Levenson, supra note 40, at 520 (describing the Rodney King beating and noting that a 
number of officers watched the brutal assault and did nothing to intervene).  
58 Don Babwin, Chicago Cops Reluctantly Testify Against 1 of Their Own, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://apnews.com/847d4519ad3546cb95378f89df74e2ae.  
Year] Article Title odd page # 
 11 
running away when Van Dyke shot him sixteen times in the back.59 Without 
the video evidence eventually released in the McDonald case, it is unlikely that 
the truth would ever have been revealed, as a result of the blue wall of silence.60  
Officers face immense pressure to uphold the blue wall of silence; if an 
officer comes forward to testify against another officer, he or she may face 
extreme retaliation.61 As a result of the blue wall of silence, when an individual 
brings an excessive force complaint against an officer, it is unlikely that other 
officers will substantiate the claim, even if they witnessed the act.62 This 
mentality may also prevent officers from intervening when other officers act 
inappropriately.63For example, in the George Floyd case, Derek Chauvin, the 
officer who killed Floyd by kneeling on his neck for nearly nine minutes, was 
____________________________________________________________ 
59 Id.; Nausheen Husain, Laquan McDonald Timeline: The Video, the Verdict and the 
Sentencing, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquan-
mcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-mcdonald-officers-fired-timeline-htmlstory.html.  
60 Id. Obtaining the dash-cam video was a feat; the Chicago Police Department initially denied 
the May 26, 2015 Freedom of Information Act request for the video, and only released it due to a 
court order on November 19, 2015. Husain, supra note 59. Five days after the court order, on 
November 24, 2015, prosecutors charged Van Dyke with first-degree murder in the McDonald case 
– had the video never been released by the police department, it is unclear whether charges would 
have been brought. See id. (providing a detailed timeline of the McDonald case, from McDonald’s 
shooting in 2014 to Van Dyke’s sentencing in 2019).  
61 Id. at 240. The Mollen Commission determined that even honest officers will become 
entangled in the blue wall of silence because “[o]fficers who report misconduct are ostracized and 
harassed; become targets of complaints and even physical threats; and are made to fear that they 
will be alone on the streets in a time of crisis.” Id. at 253–54. The Mollen Commission recounted 
one particularly brutal example of retaliation – after an honest police supervisor disciplined 
subordinate officers and communicated corrupt acts to his superiors, the supervisor “had to be 
relocated thirty-eight times.” Id. at 258. The Mollen Commission documented the reasons for his 
relocations, citing: “his locker was burned…his car tires were slashed…he received threats of 
physical harm.” Id.  
62 See id. at 254 (describing the implications of the blue wall of silence on police testimony at 
trial against fellow officers). Professor Alan Dershowitz, who has conducted significant research 
and read many trial transcripts, discovered that when officers testify, “all of the officers involved 
parrot the bogus testimony,” leaving the judge “in knowing frustration, but accepts the officers’ 
account as credible.” Id. at 255. In its investigation, the Mollen Commission determined that this 
particular type of police perjury occurs when officers illegally raided homes of known drug 
operations, and stole items or cash. Id. When defending excessive force claims, officers were known 
to uphold the blue wall of silence by writing fake charges, such as resisting arrest, into police reports 
and, at trial, repeating the same lies. Id. at 255–56. 
63 See Simone Weichselbaum, One Roadblock to Police Reform: Veteran Officers Who Train 
Recruits, NBC NEWS (Jul. 22, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/one-roadblock-
police-reform-veteran-officers-who-train-recruits-n1234532 (suggesting that officers, particularly 
newer recruits, are unlikely to disobey orders even when it is clear that another officer is acting 
inappropriately).  
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a recruit trainer with nineteen years of police experience.64 When he killed 
Floyd, he was accompanied by three other officers, two of whom had only been 
on the police force for four days and were trained by Chauvin.65 In 2016, 
Minneapolis implemented a “duty to intervene” requirement for officers, 
however, the rule is not enforceable in court, suggesting no independent body 
reviews the officers’ failures to follow the policy.66 None of the accompanying 
officers intervened to stop Floyd, likely due to fear of becoming an outcast 
within the police department.67 The trainee’s argument at a court hearing 
emphasized the cruel impact of the blue wall of silence – “[w]hat was my client 
supposed to do but follow what his training officer said?”68  
 How do police departments investigate reports of inappropriate 
conduct? The structure of law enforcement in the United States protects bad 
officers and allows them to thrive; like the trunk of the tree supporting bad 
apples, these systems safeguard officers even when they act out. There is no 
central oversight agency that holds each individual department accountable, 
nor do states necessarily have their own oversight body.69 Instead, departments 
largely handle misconduct internally, without any oversight from unbiased 
third-parties.70 When a police officer commits a bad act in the line of duty or a 
citizen files a misconduct report, the officer’s actions typically will be reviewed 
by the “Internal Affairs” unit within the department.71 Internal Affairs 
investigations into police officer misconduct are run by other police officers, 
____________________________________________________________ 
64 Id.; Associated Press, Officers Spoke Up But Didn’t Intervene When Colleague Put His Knee 
on George Floyd’s Neck, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 7, 2020), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2020/06/07/news/officers-spoke-up-but-didnt-intervene-when-
colleague-put-his-knee-on-george-floyds-neck/ [hereinafter Officers Spoke Up But Didn’t 
Intervene]. 
65 Weichselbaum, supra note 63;  Officers Spoke Up But Didn’t Intervene, supra note 64. The 
two Chauvin trainees were charged with aiding and abetting, due to their failure to intervene. 
Officers Spoke Up But Didn’t Intervene, supra note 64. 
66 Officers Spoke Up But Didn’t Intervene, supra note 64. In the aftermath of Floyd’s death, 
Minneapolis is aiming to add teeth to the policy by ensuring the duty to intervene can be enforced 
in court proceedings. Id.  
67 Officers Spoke Up But Didn’t Intervene, supra note 64. 
68 Weichselbaum, supra note 63. 
69 Duren Banks, et al., National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data (2016), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf. (demonstrating the volume of different law 
enforcement agencies in the United States).    
70 See infra notes 91–100 and accompanying text (describing the internal review structure in 
police departments). 
71 See Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 853 (2016) 
(explaining the internal affairs unit and its role within police departments).  
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who often have come through the ranks within the department and will protect 
their own, not the public or injured citizens.72 Due to this clear conflict of 
interest, many investigations do not provide satisfying results or deter bad 
conduct.73 
 To trigger an investigation by the Internal Affairs department, there must 
be a complaint, which  citizens may not feel comfortable filing because police 
departments may respond to these complaints with hostility or make the 
process so difficult that it discourages filing – the attitude of these officers and 
their treatment of complaints likely intensifies citizen distrust of law 
enforcement.74 Even when a citizen files a complaint, many police departments 
____________________________________________________________ 
72 Id. at 853–54. For example, in Boston, an internal review process governed the punishments 
of at least twenty-two of the forty-six Boston police officers who were involved in an overtime pay 
fraud. Matt Rocheleau, Most State Police Troopers Implicated in Overtime Fraud Scandal Will 
Keep Their Jobs, BOS. GLOBE (Jul. 10, 2020), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/07/10/metro/most-state-police-troopers-implicated-overtime-
fraud-scandal-will-keep-their-jobs/   The scheme “stretched back more than two years and included 
phony tickets and falsified time sheets to cover for hours never worked.” Id. After an investigation, 
the police department suspended a number of officers, but the suspended officers were nonetheless 
allowed to return to the force. Id. Since this result, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker has 
introduced legislation to ensure those in charge of internal investigations are not from within a police 
department and instead are brought in from the outside. John R. Ellement & Gal Tziperman Lotan, 
Police Unions Criticize Bill Passed in Late Senate Session, BOS. GLOBE (Jul. 20, 2020), 
https://edition.pagesuite.com/popovers/dynamic_article_popover.aspx?artguid=e20b483d-d7d1-
4bfd-ae70-ec7c46f7849b&appid=1165.  
73 See Moran, supra note 71, at 854–55; 861 (suggesting that internal affairs investigations are 
biased and, consequentially, typically do not yield satisfying results). 
74 Id. at 854–56. In fact, one American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) study determined that 
police departments in Connecticut had “widespread resistance to accepting misconduct complaints.” 
Id. at 855. During the course of the study, the ACLU encountered numerous police officers that 
would not answer questions regarding the complaint filing process, departments that required the 
complaint be brought in person, and some departments that did not allow individuals to file 
complaints about issues considered “minor.” Id. Although some departments in Connecticut were 
not so upfront about their discouragement of complaints, many “refused to accept anonymous 
complaints, third-party complaints, or complaints from minors unaccompanied by a parent or 
guardian.” Id. In Cleveland, the process is even more difficult, requiring those who file complaints 
to use their name and signature. Id. Otherwise, the Cleveland Department of Police would not 
investigate the alleged misconduct. Id. Finally, many police departments threaten individuals who 
file complaints with criminal charges for false reports. Id. at 855–56. Taken together, these types of 
practices deter individuals from complaining about poor police conduct. Id. at 856. It is no surprise, 
then, that only thirty-six percent of Black Americans trust law enforcement. Grace Sparks, Polling 
Highlights Stark Gap in Trust of Police Between Black and White Americans, CNN (Jun. 2, 2020) 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/02/politics/polls-police-black-protests/index.html. Black 
Americans, furthermore, are less likely to call the police in emergency than white Americans, due 
to distrust of officers and their ability to handle emergency situations without racial bias. Adam 
Harris, When Calling the Police is a Privilege, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/when-calling-the-police-is-a-
privilege/558608/.  
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fail to actually investigate these complaints, especially when the complaint 
alleges excessive force.75 For example, following Michael Brown’s death in 
Ferguson, Missouri, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) conducted an 
investigation of the police department.76 The investigation revealed that the 
police department in Ferguson infrequently responded to complaints of 
misconduct, and these complaints were unlikely to be investigated.77 Many 
police departments require officers to self-report any use of force so that the 
department can investigate and determine whether the force was appropriate.78 
But even when officers reported uses of force, departments frequently failed to 
review these reports.79 The courageous officers who ignore the so-called blue 
wall of silence should be rewarded for their integrity, not ostracized. 
Police unions are centralized organizations with many members. For 
example, in New York City, the Police Benevolent Association has 24,000 
members.80 In addition, it has a hefty political budget, which keeps it and other 
similarly situated unions largely immune from legislative oversight because no 
politician wants to offend the police union.81These unions often contribute to 
the continued existence of rotten apples. The police unions do not deter bad 
behavior; instead, unions often protect all officers, good and bad alike, from 
____________________________________________________________ 
75 Moran, supra note 71, at 856. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. Another example of the failure to conduct investigations into citizen complaints is the 
Denver Sheriff’s Departments’ Internal Affairs Bureau. Id. at 857. From 2011 to 2013, citizens filed 
fifty-four police misconduct complaints. Id. During this time period, the Internal Affairs Bureau 
only investigated nine of the fifty-four. Id. Further, six of these investigations were the direct result 
of the citizen filing an additional complaint with another agency, leading the Internal Affairs Bureau 
to investigate the alleged misconduct. Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. In Ferguson, the DOJ determined that the individuals tasked with reviewing uses of force 
“did little to no investigation” and “either do not understand or choose not to follow [the Ferguson 
Police Department’s] use-of-force policy in analyzing officer conduct; rarely correct officer 
misconduct when they find it; and do not see the patterns of abuse that are evident when viewing 
these incidents in the aggregate.” Id. 
80 Finnegan, supra note 55. The Police Benevolent Association in New York is the biggest U.S. 
police union. Id. Initially, it aimed to help widows of officers who died in the line of service. Id.  
81 Id. Interestingly, police unions are supported by both sides of the political aisle, existing in a 
“political paradox.” Id. Typically Republicans do not support unions, but they do support police. Id. 
In contrast, Democrats frequently criticize U.S. policing tactics, but will not often criticize unions 
because of the Party’s general support of labor unions. Id. Unions are involved in a variety of 
political activities, including “electoral politics, in litigation, and in the media.” Catherine L. Fisk & 
L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 744 (2017). In the media, police 
unions have criticized Black Lives Matter Movement and the American Civil Liberties Union, as 
well as reforms, such as citizen review of police misconduct. Id.   
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accountability.82 State statutes govern union activities, and typically permit 
police unions to collectively bargain “on any matter related to wages, hours, 
and other conditions of employment.83 This language is extremely broad, and 
grants police unions the ability to bargain on many different issues, including 
procedures for internal review of bad police acts.84  In addition, police unions 
advocate heavily on behalf of the creation of Law Enforcement Bills of Rights 
(“LEOBORs”), which provide a range of rights for police officers in state 
statutes or collective bargaining agreements.85 Police unions claim LEOBORs 
aim to ensure police officers have some rights in their dangerous roles 
protecting the public.86 In reality, however, LEOBORs may serve a more 
insidious purpose; often, these contracts make it extremely difficult to hold 
police accountable for bad acts.87 LEOBORs have granted a number of rights 
____________________________________________________________ 
82 Initially, the police did not have the right to unionize in the United States; today, however, 
the majority of police officers belong to unions. See Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 
167 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 557–58 (2019) (explaining the birth of police unions). In 1919, more than 
one thousand Boston police officers went on strike, demanding more pay and less-intense working 
hours. Id. at 557. Due to the refusal to report for duty, death and destruction broke out in Boston. 
Id. at 557–58. Arguably, this event in Boston stopped police from unionizing until the 1960s. Id. at 
558 n.61. 
83 Rushin, supra note 82, at 558. 
84 See id. at 559–60. 
85 See Nick Place, Double Due Process: How Police Unions and Law Enforcement “Bill of 
Rights” Enable Police Violence and Prevent Accountability, 52 U.S.F.L. REV. 275, 275–76 (2018) 
(describing how LEOBORs enable police to skirt public accountability for bad acts). Congress has 
attempted to pass a federal LEOBOR multiple times since the 1970s. See Kevin M. Keenan & 
Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law 
Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 197 (2005) (recounting the history 
of LEOBORs, including multiple Congressional attempts at federal legislation). State statutes, 
however, have been extremely effective; as of 2005, fourteen states enacted statutory LEOBORs 
and a number of others had introduced legislation. Id. 
86 Place, supra note 85, at 276–77. 
87Id. at 277.  Often, LEOBORs grant police officers even greater protection than the 
Constitution. Id. at 287. Unions defend the need for extended rights for the following reasons, as 
stated by the Vera Institute of Justice Special Counsel Kevin Keenan and University of Nebraska 
Professor of Criminal Justice Samuel Walker: 
“Other typical arguments for LEOBORs advanced by police unions include; (1) 
Officers need special protections, because policing is perhaps the only job in which 
people are forced to answer questions or be fired; (2) The lack of due process rights has 
led to a loss of officer confidence in the disciplinary process and a loss of morale; (3) 
Unfair treatment of officers may deter or prevent officers from carrying out their duties 
effectively and fairly; (4) The perception or reality of unfair treatment may negatively 
impact recruitment and retention efforts; (5) Effective policing depends on stable 
employer-employee relations, which the LEOBOR promotes; and (6) LEOBORs are 
needed to provide more uniform fairness among and between different departments that 
currently have widely different protections.” 
Id. at 288. 
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to police officers, including: required “waiting periods” after a bad act prior to 
questioning or investigating the situation, pre-written interrogation scripts for 
officers facing investigation, “do not call lists” that state certain officers are 
unreliable and should not be forced to testify in court, specific rules for 
interrogation of officers, and more.88 These extra rights make police reform 
difficult.89 For example, when communities attempt to implement citizen 
review processes, a union may have a LEOBOR that only allows officers to be 
questioned by other police officers.90  
If a police department decides to investigate alleged misconduct, the 
investigation typically favors the police officers, largely due to the union’s 
negotiations and LEOBORs.91 As stated above, unions structure LEOBORs to 
ensure officers are constantly protected.92 Unions may require: (1) misconduct 
to solely be investigated by other officers, (2) investigators to warn officers 
when they are under investigation, and (3) “waiting periods” prior to 
interrogation of officers under investigation.93 In New York City, for example, 
officers are given a free attorney, and if suspended pending investigation, 
____________________________________________________________ 
88Id. at 290; 292–95.  
89See Keenan & Walker, supra note 85, at 188–89 (describing how LEOBORs can impede 
progress in police reform).  
90 See id. (explaining a provision in a Maryland LEOBOR statute that “precludes the operation 
of a civilian review board (or other independent citizen oversight agency) where complaints are 
investigated by non-sworn investigators”). Union agreements may also impede the ability of 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) consent decrees to create change within police departments.. Fisk & 
Richardson, supra note 81, at 755 (describing how police unions may impede progress attempted 
via Department of Justice (“DOJ”) consent decrees). DOJ consent decrees are agreements between 
police departments and the DOJ lasting a specific number of years that impose new measures to 
improve department behavior and culture. Los Angeles Police Department, Civil Rights Consent 
Decree, L.A. POLICE DEP’T (last visited Jul. 12, 2020), 
http://www.lapdonline.org/search_results/content_basic_view/928. Unfortunately, police union 
agreements and state statutes may stand in the way of these agreements, as DOJ consent decrees often 
can only be imposed in ways that do not clash with union contracts, causing some provisions to go 
ignored. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 90, at 755–56. For example, some consent decrees may 
impose new conditions for working in specific departments; union contracts, however, state that 
working conditions must be subject to collective bargaining. Id. at 755–56. Thus, due to the union 
contract, the offending department may not actually have to abide by the consent decree because it was 
not entered into via collective bargaining, lessening the impact of the consent decree. Id. In one study, 
researchers determined that seven of seventeen consent decrees entered into between 1997 and 2016 
were affected by union contracts, leading to less effective police department reforms. Id. at 755.   
91 Id. at 859. 
92 See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text (explaining the impact LEOBORs may have 
on the ability to investigate police acts).  
93 See Place, supra note 85, at 290–91, 295–96 (summarizing provisions in LEOBORs that 
impede unbiased investigation of police misconduct).  
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typically still receive pay.94 Investigation requirements in LEOBORs are not 
the only hurdle when filing complaints – in addition, many departments impose 
rigorous standards of proof for citizen complaints.95 In Cleveland, for a citizen 
to prevail on his or her complaint, he or she must demonstrate that the conduct 
occurred “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which is “the highest standard in 
American law.”96 In San Jose, if a citizen files a complaint alleging racial bias, 
the individual must demonstrate that the offending officer was “motivated by 
race.”97 
When a police department does conduct an investigation of an officer’s 
misconduct, it is unlikely that Internal Affairs will impose significant 
punishment.98 Further, even when warranted, the police are unlikely to share 
relevant information with prosecutors offices to allow criminal charges against 
the offending officers.99 As a result of challenging complaint filing processes, 
union-shaped LEOBORs, and perilously high standards of proof for citizen 
complaints, the review process fails to hold officers accountable, and does not 
deter poor police conduct.100 
Finally, when an officer’s conduct touches upon criminal responsibility, 
the case is typically handled by a local prosecutor who often has both personal 
and professional relationships with the local police, which may discourage 
____________________________________________________________ 
94 Finnegan, supra note 55. 
95 Moran, supra note 71, at 859.  
96 Id. In fact, a DOJ report on Internal Affairs investigations revealed that many officers aim to 
“cast the accused officers in the best light possible” during investigations, rather than determining 
the truth. Id. The DOJ report found that, in Cleveland, these investigations “cuts at the heart of the 
accountability system” of the police department. Id.  
97 See id. at 859 (recounting the San Jose police department’s process for handling complaints 
that allege racially biased police practices).  
98 Id. at 866. Even in clear-cut cases, police departments avoid disciplining their own. Id. For 
example, in Ferguson, there was significant evidence of officers sending emails with racially 
charged language. Id. The emails, which were never reported to Internal Affairs, were “stereotyping 
minorities as lazy, unemployed, living off welfare, and prone to committing crimes.” Id. Similarly, 
in Seattle, many officers used derogatory racial slurs when speaking to each other about minority 
suspects. Id. One officer even threatened to “beat the f’ing Mexican piss out of a suspect.” Id. This 
incident was recorded and seen by a number of officers; not a single person reported it and the 
offending officer faced no discipline until an individual who had seen and recorded the incident 
released the video publicly. Id.  
99 Id. at 857. For example, the DOJ found “multiple instances in which credible complaints of 
potentially criminal uses of force were not referred to prosecutors for review, even though by any 
objective measure they should have been” in an investigation of the Newark Police Department. Id.  
100 See generally id. (arguing that police department review procedures fail to hold officers 
accountable for bad acts and suggesting reforms that could improve the process).  
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prosecutors from bringing criminal charges against police officers.101 Police 
officers are engaged in nearly every aspect of a criminal case, which means 
prosecutors must have a good relationship with law enforcement to be 
effective.102Thus, it is unlikely that prosecutors will hold police officers 
accountable in court for misconduct and when they do, the case will likely be 
tainted by pro-police bias; prosecutors need their working relationships with 
police, and bringing charges against an officer could endanger their alliance.103  
II. HOW THE SUPREME COURT FAILS TO HOLD OFFICERS ACCOUNTABLE 
This section presents a change in attitude toward law enforcement. There 
is an inverse relationship to the power of police and the rights of individual. 
Although it is difficult to argue that Supreme Court cases actually deter police 
officers, the change in attitude by the Court send the wrong message. 
From the 1953 appointment of Chief Justice Earl Warren to his retirement 
in 1969, the Warren Court decided a number of decisions that provided 
significant constitutional protections to criminal defendants.104 The Warren 
____________________________________________________________ 
101 See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 2 (2d. ed. 2013) (suggesting that special 
prosecutors may be necessary to avoid conflicts of interest in prosecutions of police officers). 
Appointing a special prosecutor may ensure that he prosecution is fair, as local prosecutors offices 
typically have a close working relationship with the local law enforcement office. Id.  
102See Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV 1447, 1465–69 
(2016) (suggesting that conflicts of interest exist between prosecutor offices and law enforcement, 
resulting in prosecutors being unable or unwilling to charge police officers with criminal 
misconduct). As one scholar stated, “one ought not underestimate the unifying influence of a shared 
commitment to ‘getting the bad guys,’ hardened by the adversarial process, nurtured by mutual 
respect and need, and on occasion lubricated by alcohol.” Id. at 1469.  
103 See id. at 1472 (arguing that any prosecutor who decided to charge officers with misconduct 
would lose his or her relationship with the police, which leads many prosecutors to ignore police 
misconduct). In addition, prosecutors are under immense pressure to have a strong conviction 
record. Id. at 1471. Conviction records are critical to advancing a career in prosecution. Id. 
Prosecuting police officers could ruin a relationship with the district’s law enforcement, which could 
make it more difficult to obtain convictions and, subsequently, stunt a prosecutor’s career 
advancement. Id. at 1471–72. As Justice Frank Murphy stated in his dissenting opinion in Wolf v. 
Colorado in 1949, “[s]elf-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we expect 
a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search 
and seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates have ordered.” 388 U.S. 25, 
42 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).  
104 See e.g. Katz v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that an expectation of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment is based on reasonableness, not solely the trespass doctrine); Miranda 
v. Arizona, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing the Miranda Warning, which requires officers to warn 
arrested individuals of their rights to counsel and silence when arrested); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961) (requiring states to use the exclusionary rule remedy); Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure 
Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1365 n.7 (2004) (stating the Warren Court’s time period). 
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Court examined a number of police practices resulting in violations of an 
individual’s constitutional rights, including interrogations, eye witness 
identifications, and search and seizure.105 Through these decisions, the Court 
aimed to restrain the police.106 Most importantly, to deter the police from 
violating these doctrines, the Warren Court established that the exclusionary 
remedy, which excludes illegally obtained evidence at trial, applies to the 
states.107 
In Mapp, the Warren Court applied the exclusionary remedy for 
constitutional violations, established in Weeks v. United States for federal 
actions, to the states. 108 After reviewing the status of U.S. jurisprudence and 
____________________________________________________________ 
Notably, Chief Justice Warren had extensive law enforcement experience.  Yale Kamisar, How Earl 
Warren’s Twenty Years in Law Enforcement Affected His Work as Chief Justice, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 11, 11–13 (2005). Prior to his tenure as California’s governor, Chief Justice Warren served in 
various law enforcement roles over a period of twenty-two years; he spent five years as deputy 
district attorney, thirteen years as the chief of the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, and 
four years as the attorney general of California. Id. at 11–12. One scholar suggests that these 
experiences in law enforcement may have informed the Chief Justice’s approach to criminal 
procedure. Id. at 12–13. During his tenure as district attorney of Alameda County, Chief Justice 
Warren required his deputy district attorneys and agents to conduct themselves with the utmost 
integrity, which led to the nickname of the “Boy Scouts” within the state. Id. at 12. In his time as 
district attorney, “[h]is office had a higher conviction rate than the great majority of district attorney 
offices in the state and none of the convictions his office obtained were ever reversed on appeal.” 
Id. at 12.    
105 The Warren Court considered the requirements for lineup procedures. Stovall v. Denno, 383 
U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967) (requiring lineup procedures to not be unnecessarily suggestive under the 
totality of the circumstances). The Court also considered the Sixth Amendment and the right to 
counsel. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (determining that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches for a post-indictment lineup); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 344–45 (1963) (finding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires the states to appoint 
counsel for indigent defendants). The Warren Court introduced the famous Miranda warning. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (establishing the Miranda warning, which 
requires law enforcement to advise a suspect of his rights to counsel and silence prior to questioning 
to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination). The Court significantly expanded the right to 
privacy. Katz, 384 U.S. at 351 (determining that an expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment is based on reasonableness, not solely property rights or trespass law). Most 
importantly, the Court determined that the exclusionary rule applies to the states.  Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary remedy to the states). 
106 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (listing a number of Warren Court decisions that 
provided individuals with significant rights and aimed to restrain law enforcement).  
107 See infra notes 108–114 and accompanying text (summarizing the Warren Court’s decision, 
Mapp v. Ohio, which applied the exclusionary rule to the states).  
108 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. The exclusionary rule, first applied in Weeks v. United States in 
1914, provided a remedy for an individual subjected to an illegal search under the Fourth 
Amendment and facing federal charges. See 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914) (holding that evidence 
obtained illegally could not be used against the defendant at trial, and thus, establishing the 
exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions). Noting that the Fourth Amendment assures the right to 
be safe from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” but fails to provide an explicit remedy for those 
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noting that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy was incorporated via the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court determined that the exclusionary rule must 
be enforceable against the states as well as the federal government.109 Without 
the exclusionary remedy, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment would 
have no teeth and be a mere “form of words.”110 Mapp introduces a critical 
element of the Warren Court’s approach to criminal procedure – deterring the 
police from bad acts by excluding evidence obtained illegally.111 The goal of 
the exclusionary remedy, which suppresses illegally obtained evidence at trial, 
is to incentivize the police to conduct themselves in line with the law to ensure 
evidence can be used at trial.112  The Warren Court’s decisions are often 
____________________________________________________________ 
subjected to illegal searches, the Court determined that the appropriate remedy would be exclusion 
of the illegally obtained evidence at trial. Id. at 389; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Following 
Weeks and prior to Mapp, the Court declined to apply the exclusionary remedy to the states in Wolf 
v. Colorado, a 1949 decision. 388 U.S. 25, 26 (1949) (“the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject 
criminal justice in the States to specific limitation”). 
109 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 656 (“Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule ‘is to deter – to compel respect for the constitutionally guaranty in the only effectively available 
way – by removing the incentive to disregard it.’”) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
217 (1960)); see Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U.L. REV. 1555, 1567 (2015) (describing the Mapp decision and 
emphasizing the Warren Court’s desire to deter bad police conduct). 
112 Ristroph, supra note 111, at 1567. Arguably, this remedy places the police officer’s behavior 
at the forefront; the goal of the remedy is to ensure that police activity is conducted with the utmost 
respect for the law. Id. The exclusionary remedy is not without its critics. See Donald V. 
MacDougall, Criminal Law: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives – Remedies for 
Constitutional Violations in Canada and the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 608, 
634 (1985) (describing John Wigmore’s critique of the exclusionary remedy). John Wigmore, the 
author of the prominent evidence treatise, Wigmore on Evidence, described the exclusionary rule as 
“indirect and unnatural.” Id. at 635. Wigmore had four primary reasons why he did not approve of 
the exclusionary rule: “(1) it ignores the proper complaint, investigation process and trial of an 
alleged violation of law; (2) as an incidental violation it jeopardizes (by delay, confusion, etc.) the 
primary litigation; (3) it is unnecessary because persons harmed have more direct means of redress; 
and (4) ‘the judicial rules of evidence were never meant to be used as an indirect method of 
punishment.” Id. (quoting JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2184a n. 1 
(J. McNaughton rev. 1961)).  Other scholars suggest that the remedy is ineffective because it fails 
to “connect” to the violation and its costs fall on individuals who did not inflict the wrong. See 
Robert C. Fellmeth, The Optimum Remedy for Constitutional Breaches: MultiAccessed Civil 
Penalties in Equity, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 923, 925 (1999) (arguing that the exclusionary rule is 
ineffective and alternatives to the rule would better serve the criminal justice system). Famously, in 
1926 in the Court of Appeals of New York case People v. Defore, then-Judge and later Supreme 
Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo stated that the exclusionary rule is flawed: “[t]he criminal is to go 
free because the constable has blundered.” 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
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referred to as the criminal procedure “revolution.”113 Although there is much 
debate as to whether it actually deters police action, at a minimum it increased 
police training and forced police to think about the rights of individuals.114 
 The Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have largely cutback on 
the individual rights created by the Warren Court and have tended to favor law 
enforcement practices.115 The major cutback has been to the exclusionary 
remedy.116 These Courts were often concerned that reliable evidence was being 
excluded, thus distorting the truth-finding process.117 With this in mind, the 
Burger Court adopted a balancing test, weighing the benefits of the 
exclusionary rule - deterring bad police behavior -  against the drawbacks – 
____________________________________________________________ 
113 See Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (explaining the typical narrative of the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure decisions, which is often described as a “revolution” for individual rights). 
114 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
421 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting) (criticizing the exclusionary remedy, but arguing that removing 
the rule would be counter to the public interest because police officers would believe “that an open 
season on ‘criminals’ had been declared”). 
115 A number of cases demonstrate cutbacks to rights and procedures created by the Warren 
Court. The Miranda decision’s impact has been significantly reduced. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (requiring a suspect, paradoxically, to speak to invoke the right to silence 
because remaining silent for three hours is too “ambiguous”);  New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 
651 (1984) (creating an exception to the Miranda warning requirement when there is a threat to 
“public safety”); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 527–28 (1987) (determining that a 
defendant’s Miranda waiver is legitimate even if he or she has given mixed signals about his or her 
willingness to engage with law enforcement, such as an unwillingness to write a confession but a 
willingness to speak to officers); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375–76 (1979) (deciding 
that waiver of Miranda rights does not need to be explicit and implicit waivers may be sufficient). 
Similarly, the eyewitness identification standards created by the Warren Court have received much 
negative treatment.  See Perry v. New Hampshire, 556 U.S. 228, 233 (2012) (holding that eye 
witness identifications are admissible, even when suggestive, so long as the police themselves were 
not responsible for the suggestive nature of the procedure); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 
(1977) (casting aside Stovall, which required a totality of the circumstances test for eyewitness 
identifications and excluded those determined to be suggestive, and declaring “reliability is the 
linchpin,” such that even suggestive identifications may be admissible if reliable). Even Sixth 
Amendment rights have been reduced after the Warren Court. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 
300, 301–02 (1973) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to post-
indictment photo arrays); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 685, 689 (1972) (determining that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until “the initiation of adversary judicial criminal 
proceedings,” which does not include pre-indictment lineups). 
116 See infra notes 118–125 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the many 
cutbacks to the exclusionary rule following the Warren Court). 
117 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (emphasizing the “substantial social 
costs” of the exclusionary rule and suggesting that an “unbending application” of the rule “would 
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury”) (quoting United States v. 
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)). 
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excluding reliable evidence.118 Initially this balance was used to restrict the 
exclusionary remedy for proceedings other than criminal trials.119 In 1984, 
however, in United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court applied the balancing 
test to a criminal trial.120 The Court created a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule when police officers rely upon a warrant that later was 
determined to be invalid. 121 When police mistakenly rely on a warrant, signed 
by a neutral and detached magistrate, the Court determined that the deterrent 
effect of excluding the evidence would be negligible.122 
In Leon, a neutral, detached magistrate evaluated the evidence and issued 
the warrant, suggesting the good faith exception was only applicable if the 
police got a warrant, however, the Leon good faith exception has been extended 
and manipulated significantly.123 Illinois v. Krull created an exception for good-
faith reliance on statute and Arizona v. Evans created an exception for good-
____________________________________________________________ 
118 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (“In deciding whether to extend 
the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential injury to the historic 
role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in this 
context.”).   
119 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (declining to apply the 
exclusionary rule in parole board hearings after applying a balancing text); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (applying a balancing test and refusing to apply the exclusionary rule 
in civil deportation proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448, 454 (1976) (holding 
that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil tax actions after using a balancing test); Calandra, 
414 U.S. at 349 (determining that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings, 
following a balancing test).  
120 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906–07 (extending the balancing test approach to criminal trials and 
holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when an individual acts in good-faith reliance 
upon a warrant later determined to be lacking probable cause).  
121 Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 (“when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith 
or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty 
defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system”). The Court noted that the 
exclusionary rule is only used when its “remedial objective” of police deterrence is “effaciously 
served.” Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348). In Leon, the Court considered a case where police 
officers obtained a warrant to search two different residences for drugs; the warrant, however, was 
subsequently found to be lacking requisite probable cause. Id. at 903–04. Thus, although the police 
officers had relied upon a legitimate warrant from a judge, the evidence was excluded at trial. Id. at 
903. At the motion to suppress hearing, the government argued for a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule when officers rely upon a warrant when conducting a search – although the district 
court found that the officers acted in good faith, it declined to create a good faith exception for the 
exclusionary rule. Id. at 904. 
122 Leon, 468 U.S. at 908.  
123 Compare id. at 913 (explaining that the officers in Leon relied upon a warrant issued by a 
magistrate), with Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 356–57 (1987) (finding an exception to the 
exclusionary rule when an officer relies upon an unconstitutional statute).  
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faith reliance on an incorrect, outstanding arrest warrant.124 Most recently, in 
Herring v. United States in 2009, the Supreme Court determined that even 
when an officer wrongfully relies on the negligent bookkeeping of a fellow 
police officer, the good-faith exception applies – although the mistake is 
directly attributable to law enforcement, the Court still found the deterrent 
effect to be negligible.125 Taken together, these exceptions swallow up the 
exclusionary remedy and send a message to police – so long as you seem to be 
acting in “good-faith,” your actions will be considered appropriate, even when 
unconstitutional. 
Terry v. Ohio, a 1968 Warren Court case, aimed to provide additional rights 
for individuals on the street.126 In Terry, the Court addressed the common 
police practice of stopping and sometimes frisking an individual without any 
justification.127 The Court decided that this practice was governed by the Fourth 
Amendment.128 Because this activity did not amount to a full scale arrest, 
however, the Court created a standard of justification “reasonable suspicion” 
for these interactions, which required justification less than probable cause.129  
____________________________________________________________ 
124 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995) (holding that good-faith reliance on an incorrect, 
outstanding arrest warrant will not result in the exclusionary rule being applied); Krull, 480 U.S. at 
356–57 (creating an exception to the exclusionary rule when an officer reasonably relies, in good 
faith, on an unconstitutional statute). 
125 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). 
126See 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies in stop-and-frisk 
encounters, but does not require the typical standard of probable cause).  
127 See id. at 4 (“This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth 
Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman investigating 
suspicious circumstances.”).  
128 Id. at 20.  
129 Id. at 27 (“And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, 
due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the 
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.”). “Probable cause,” which is necessary to obtain a warrant for a full-scale arrest or 
search, is defined as “[a] reasonable ground to suspect someone has committed or is committing a 
crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime.” Probable Cause, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Probable cause “amounts to more than a bare suspicion but less 
than evidence that would justify conviction.” Id. In contrast, “reasonable suspicion,” which is 
required to stop an individual on the street and in some cases conduct a brief search for weapons, 
requires “a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts, for 
suspecting a person of criminal activity.” Reasonable Suspicion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019). The lesser requirements of reasonable suspicion reflects the lesser intrusion of being 
stopped on the street, as opposed to being arrested or subjected to a full-scale search. See Terry, 392 
U.S. at 26 (“An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited 
search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different.”).  
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Despite the Warren Courts good intentions to provide constitutional 
protection for a common police practice, the reasonable suspicion standard has 
become another method for racist action by the police. In a 2016 Supreme 
Court case concerning a stop based on the Terry reasonable suspicion standard, 
Utah v. Strieff, the misuse of the standard was clear.130 In Strieff, a police officer, 
operating on an anonymous tip, observed a suspected drug house for a week, 
watched individuals come and go in short intervals, and determined that it was 
likely that the tip was correct.131 The officer stopped the respondent, Strieff, 
after merely seeing him leave the residence, detained him, demanded he 
identify himself, and asked him what he had been doing at the house.132 Once 
Strieff identified himself, the officer called into dispatch and relayed Strieff’s 
information; a search of the records revealed an outstanding arrest warrant, 
which the officer used to arrest Strieff and conduct a search incident to arrest.133 
The search revealed a bag of methamphetamine and other drug-related 
items.134 The Court determined that the stop itself was inappropriate because 
the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, but found that the outstanding arrest 
warrant attenuated the taint of the illegal stop and ruled the evidence was 
admissible, declining to apply the exclusionary remedy.135  
Justice Sonya Sotomayor, in dissent, raised significant concerns regarding 
the Terry standard and its manipulation in this case.136 First, Justice Sotomayor 
drew attention to the vast number of outstanding arrest warrants in the United 
States that would legitimize this kind of stop; officers often stop individuals on 
the street merely to run a warrant check, and “93% of the stops would [be] 
considered unsupported by articulated reasonable suspicion,” according to a 
Justice Department study.137 Thus, the Strieff decision undercuts the Warren 
Court’s intent in creating the reasonable suspicion standard – given the quantity 
of outstanding arrest warrants, many illegal stops will ultimately be considered 
____________________________________________________________ 
130 See generally 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (holding that an outstanding arrest warrant attenuated 
the taint of an unconstitutional application of the reasonable suspicion standard articulated in Terry). 
131 Id. at 2059. 
132 Id. at 2060. 
133 Id. Notably, the warrant was for a traffic violation. Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 2063. The Court found that once the officer found the outstanding warrant, “he had an 
obligation to arrest Strieff.” Id. at 2062.  
136 See id. at 2068–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing the impact Terry and its progeny 
have upon people of color, and Black Americans specifically, and emphasizing the massive database 
of outstanding warrants, which would legitimize these kinds of stops). 
137 Id. at 2068–69. 
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justified.138 Further, Justice Sotomayor noted the Supreme Court-approved 
justifications for stopping individuals on the street – ethnicity, clothing, 
location, and behavior may all be factored into an officer’s judgment.139 Justice 
Sotomayor drew attention to the harsh reality of the standard -  although 
innocent people of all races will likely be subjected to stops by police, “it is no 
secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type of 
scrutiny.”140 As Justice Sotomayor suggested in her dissent, the implications of 
Terry are far-reaching and grant substantial discretion to law enforcement.141 
Terry set the legal basis for New York City’s infamous stop and frisk procedure, 
which overwhelmingly effected people of color and resulted in more than five 
million innocent individuals being stopped by the police.142 Notably, President 
Barack Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing suggested departments 
implement procedures requiring officers to record their reasons for stopping 
____________________________________________________________ 
138 See generally id. at 2068–69. As Justice Sotomayor explains, there are more than 7.8 million 
outstanding warrants in the United States. Id. at 2068. Many of these warrants are for minor 
violations, such as traffic infractions. Id. For example, at the time of Strieff, Ferguson, Missouri had 
16,000 outstanding arrest warrants against individuals – the town itself had a population of just 
21,000. Id. Thus, officers could essentially stop anyone without fear of any evidence discovered 
being excluded. See id.  
139 See id. at 2069 (providing an overview of Supreme Court cases that allowed police officers 
to consider factors such as race, attire, location, and an individual’s behavior in the reasonable 
suspicion determination); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (stating that 
“unprovoked flight” from the police may be considered in the reasonable suspicion evaluation); 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1989) (determining that an individual’s clothing, such 
as a “black jumpsuit and [wearing] gold jewelry,” can be considered when evaluating reasonable 
suspicion); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975) (allowing police officers 
to consider “apparent Mexican ancestry” when determining reasonable suspicion to stop an 
individual to determine if he or she is an undocumented immigrant); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143, 147 (1972) (giving police officers the ability to consider location, including being in a “high-
crime area,” in the reasonable suspicion determination). 
140 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). As Justice Sotomayor noted, Black 
children are subjected to a conversation that no white children must ever endure – “the talk.” Id. 
Due to the disproportionate criminalization of Black Americans, parents of young children of color 
must remind them “never to run down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; 
do not even think of talking back to a stranger – all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will 
react to them.” Id.  
141 See generally Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth 
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s failure to protect 
individuals from being stopped on the basis of race has led to Black Americans disproportionate 
stops by police).  
142 See ACLU of New York, Annual Stop-and-Frisk Numbers, NYCLU (last visited Jul. 16, 
2020), https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-data (reporting data collected from 2011 to 2019 
regarding stop-and-frisk in New York). From 2003 to 2019, Black Americans consistently 
comprised more than 50% of people stopped in New York City. Id.  
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individuals on the street.143 The goal of this reform is to trace whether officers 
are stopping people due to racial biases, and hold officers accountable.144 
  In 1996 in Whren v. United States, the Court granted police officers 
significant discretion to stop automobiles.145 The Court determined that when 
an officer has probable cause to stop a car for anything, including a minor 
traffic violation, a subsequent search and seizure is justified even when the 
officer had other subjective intentions and the traffic stop was pretextual.146The 
facts of this case lead to a reasonable conclusion of racism.147In Whren, two 
vice-squad police officers, in a “high drug area,” stopped two young Black men 
who were sitting in a car and looking down.148 After the car stayed at an 
intersection for “an unusually long time,” it drove off at a high speed and made 
a right-turn without signaling; the officers claimed they stopped the car due to 
the illegal right-turn.149During the traffic stop, the officers saw bags of crack 
cocaine in plain view, leading to the individuals’ arrests.150 It strains ones 
imagination to think that vice cops were enforcing traffic violations; they used 
the traffic violation to see if they were sniffing cocaine. At first blush the 
holding in Whren may not seem problematic, as it merely allows officers to 
make a stop when they have probable cause.151 Unfortunately, however, the 
____________________________________________________________ 
143 Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, at 27 (May 2015), 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Final Report of the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing].  
144 See id. 
145 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996). 
146 Id. At trial, the petitioners argued that the police officers did not have probable cause, or the 
lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, to believe that the car and the petitioners were involved with 
illegal drugs. Id. The petitioners argued that the stop was pretextual, meaning “ the police use[d] a 
legal justification to make a stop…in order to search a person or his vehicle, or interrogate him, for 
an unrelated and more serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion necessary 
to support a stop.” United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 559 n.10 (6th Cir. 1998). In the words 
of one scholar, the government argued for a “could have” standard for stopping cars – “any time the 
police could have stopped the defendant for a traffic violation, it does not matter that police actually 
stopped him to investigate a crime for which the police had little or no evidence.” David A. Harris, 
“Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic 
Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 544 (1997) [hereinafter “Driving While Black”]. In 
contrast, the defense advocated on behalf of a “would have” standard – “a seizure based on a traffic 
stop would only stand if a reasonable officer would have made this particular stop.” Id. 
147 See generally Whren, 517 U.S. 806. 
148 Id. at 808; 810. 
149 Id. at 808. 
150 Id. at 808–09. 
151 See “Driving While Black”, supra note 146, at 544–45 (suggesting that the outcome in 
Whren was predictable because the Supreme Court merely affirmed police officers’ ability to stop 
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application of Whren and the reality of driving provides police with substantial 
power and leeway to stop anyone on the road.152 As a driver, it is nearly 
impossible to drive perfectly at all times; any number of infractions would 
warrant probable cause, including driving above the speed limit, or like the 
petitioners in Whren, failing to use a turn signal.153 Although the Supreme 
Court suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
would protect against racially motivated stops, it did not offer remedies for 
individuals stopped due to their race, nor did it provide a a framework to prove 
that a police officer had intentionally discriminated on the basis of race.154 
Prior to Whren, there was concern that police officers disproportionally 
stopped Black drivers.155 Post-Whren, there is considerable evidence that Black 
Americans are stopped at disproportional rates when compared to white 
Americans.156  An individual would need to show direct discrimination, which 
____________________________________________________________ 
and search an individual when they have probable cause to believe the individual has broken the 
law). 
152 See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics and the Law: Why Driving While Black 
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 311 n.183 (1999) [hereinafter The Stories, the Statistics, and the 
Law] (stating “Whren means that police officers can stop any driver, any time they are willing to 
follow the car for a short distance”). In the 1960s, during a study of police officers, one officer 
stated: “You can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic violation if you tail him for a while, and 
then a search can be made. In the event that we see a suspicious automobile or occupant and wish 
to search the person or the car, or both, we will usually follow the vehicle until the driver makes a 
technical violation of a traffic law.” Id. (quoting LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF 
CRIMe 131 (1967)).  
153 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808 (describing the petitioners’ traffic violation in Whren – failing 
to use a turn signal); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial 
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 318–19 (2001) (stating 
that “virtually every driver commits violations of the traffic laws on a regular basis”). 
154 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally 
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause…[s]ubjective intentions play no 
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); Rudovsky, supra note 153, at 320 
(noting that the Supreme Court did not provide clear steps to allege intentional race discrimination 
under the Fourteenth Amendment during traffic stops).  
155 See “Driving While Black”, supra note 146, at 546 (expressing concern regarding the 
application of Whren because Black drivers already faced biased treatment by police). As Harris 
states in his article, it is so common for the police to stop Black Americans that “African-Americans 
sometimes say they have been stopped for the offense of ‘driving while black.’” Id.  
156 See, e.g., Jackie Bensen and Sophia Barnes, Data Shows Police Stop Black People at 
Disproportionately High Rate in DC, NBC WASH. (Jun. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/data-shows-black-people-stopped-at-
disproportionately-high-rate-in-dc/2335746/ (reporting data that showed “more than 70%” of 
individuals stopped in Washington, D.C. by police officers between July 2019 and December 2019 
were Black, although Black Americans constitute less than 50% of D.C.’s population); Darwin 
Bond Graham, Black People in California are Stopped Far More Often by Police, Major Study 
Proves, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
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is extremely difficult because the most damning evidence would be the 
arresting officer’s testimony.157 Only the individual who conducted the stop 
knows his or her intention, and unfortunately, police officers are known to lie 
(and even commit perjury) to protect their true reasons for stopping 
motorists.158 Thus, Black Americans face an uphill battle to show that they are 
facing racial discrimination; statistics are insufficient, and showing direct 
evidence may be impossible.159  
These decisions since the Warren Court clearly indicate that police 
practices resulting in criminal prosecution will not receive significant 
____________________________________________________________ 
news/2020/jan/02/california-police-black-stops-force (stating that 28% of individuals stopped by 
police in Los Angeles in 2018 were Black, although Black individuals are only 9% of Los Angeles’ 
population); Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving While 
Black, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-
stops-driving-black.html (recounting statistics from North Carolina demonstrating that Black 
Americans are disproportionately stopped by the police); see also “Driving While Black”, supra 
note 146, at 560 (arguing, in 1997, that Black Americans would be disproportionally stopped post-
Whren, even though no statistical evidence existed at the time). Pretextual stops that aim to 
investigate other crimes in particular – as opposed to stops driven by traffic violations – are largely 
driven by the race of the individual. See Kathryne M. Young and Joan Petersilia, Book Review, 
Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and the Expansion of the Carceral State, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1318, 1324 (2016) (explaining the clear racial differences in individuals stopped by police for 
investigatory reasons). In fact, race, youth, and gender are the most consistent predictors of whether 
a police officer will make an investigatory stop. Id. Young, Black men are the most likely to be 
stopped in these situations. Id.  
157 See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 380–81 (1998) 
(explaining the issue of police testimony). 
158  Id. at 380–84. In 1994, New York City conducted a study to determine the pervasiveness 
of police perjury and misconduct within the city. Id. at 380–81. The Mollen Commission determined 
that although “it is impossible to gauge the full extent of police falsifications…[s]everal 
officers…told us that the practice of police falsification in connection with such arrests is so 
common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word: ‘testi(l)ying.’” Id. at 380.      
159 Notably, some states have adopted reforms requiring officers to record the reason for their 
stops to avoid racial bias and track whether officers are using racist tactics in their stops. See Eileen 
Buckley, Phase One of Mayor’s Police Reforms Begin Today, WKBW (last updated Jun. 24, 2020), 
https://www.wkbw.com/news/local-news/mayor-brown-ready-to-implement-phase-one-of-police-
reform (announcing the implementation of “stop receipts” in Buffalo, New York, which will require 
officers to record their reasons for stopping vehicles). In Buffalo, New York, for example, the Mayor 
requires police officers to issue a “stop receipt” after all traffic stops. Id. In the receipt, the officer 
must state exactly what he or she observed that led to the stop. Id. Furthermore, the officer must 
state his or her reasons to the individual driving the vehicle, in addition to recording the reasons for 
Buffalo’s records. Id. Similarly, in Connecticut in June 2020, Governor Ned Lamont’s Police 
Accountability and Transparency Task Force released its twenty-two priorities for police reform, 
which include requiring police officers to explain their reasons for stopping individuals. See Kelan 
Lyons, Policing Task Force Outlines 22 Reform Priorities, CT MIRROR (Jun. 16, 2020), 
https://ctmirror.org/2020/06/16/policing-task-force-outlines-22-reform-priorities/ (describing 
twenty-two policing reforms Connecticut aims to implement). 
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scrutiny.160 This brings to mind Chief Justice Burger’s admonition in the case 
of Bivens v. Six Unkown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics.161 His 
dissenting opinion clearly indicated his disdain for the exclusionary rule; 
nevertheless he refused to eliminate it because “[o]bviously the public interest 
would be poorly served if law enforcement officials were suddenly to gain the 
impression, however erroneous, that all constitutional restraints on police had 
somehow been removed -- that an open season on ‘criminals’ had been 
declared.”162 Unfortunately, based on the cutbacks to Warren Court decisions, 
it seems the Chief Justice’s concerns have come to fruition. 163 
One final Supreme Court doctrine that fails to deter police officers is 
qualified immunity, which may apply in civil suits alleging constitutional 
violations against police officers.164 These suits are somewhat rare, difficult to 
prove, and rarely result in significant damages.165 When a suit is brought, police 
typically enjoy the protection of qualified immunity.166 In 1967 in Pierson v. 
Ray, the Supreme Court granted qualified immunity to police officers for the 
first time, holding that officers can assert the defense of good faith and probable 
cause, based on defenses established at common law, granting them immunity 
____________________________________________________________ 
160 See supra notes 130–159 and accompanying text (describing subsequent Court’s cutbacks 
to the individual rights provided by Warren Court decisions and explaining how later Courts have 
given police officers enormous discretion).  
161 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 421 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
162 Id.  
163 See supra notes 130–159 and accompanying text (suggesting that Courts after the Warren 
Court have cutback substantially on the rights of individuals to provide discretion and power to law 
enforcement).  
164 See Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1797, 1799 (2018) (“In many ways, qualified immunity’s shield against government damages 
liability is stronger than ever.”). Qualified immunity is typically raised as a defense to civil actions 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which holds state officials liable for violation of individual’s 
constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 45, 49 (2018). The defense is, notably, not codified in the code itself. Baude, supra, 
at 50. 
165 See Baude, supra note 164, at 83–84 (summarizing the history of qualified immunity cases 
reviewed by the Supreme Court). See generally Martin A. Schwartz, Fundamentals of Section 1983 
Litigation, 17 TOURO L. REV. 525 (2001) (providing an overview of Section 1983 claims and 
pointing out a number of difficulties inherent in bringing a case). 
166 Baude, supra note 164, at 83–84. From 1982 to 107, thirty qualified immunity cases 
appeared before the Court. Id. at 82. The Court granted qualified immunity to the defendant in 
twenty-eight of these cases. Id. Furthermore, because the Supreme Court so frequently grants 
qualified immunity, lower courts typically follow suit, as it becomes more difficult to find “a 
violation of clearly established law,” required to deny qualified immunity. Id. at 83.  
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from prosecution. 167  The doctrine of qualified immunity elucidated by the 
Court in Pierson has significantly evolved over time to give additional 
protections to police officers.168Today, to prove that an officer violated the 
rights of an individual, the individual must show that the constitutional 
violation was “clearly established.”169 If the violation is not “clearly 
established,” the officer will be granted qualified immunity.170 Courts have 
struggled with the requirement of a “clearly established” violation, however, in 
2015 in Mullenix v. Luna, the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in a 
decision significantly expanding qualified immunity for police officers.171 The 
Court, after reviewing the “hazy legal background” of cases similar to 
____________________________________________________________ 
167 See 386 U.S. 547, 556–57 (1967) (allowing police officers to bring a defense of “good faith 
and probable cause” in response to a § 1983 claim); see also Marcus R. Nemeth, Note, How Was That 
Reasonable? The Misguided Development of Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force by Law 
Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C. L. REV. 989, 999 (2019) (“The origin of qualified immunity lies with 
the Court’s 1967 holding in Pierson v. Ray.”). Specifically, Pierson granted qualified immunity to 
officers in § 1983 cases; when a police officer violates the constitutional rights of an individual, the 
individual may bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages. See David P. Stoelting, Comment, 
Qualified Immunity for Law Enforcement Officials in Section 1983 Excessive Force Cases, 58 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 243, 243 (1989) (providing an overview of § 1983); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
168 See Nemeth, supra note 167, at 1004–05 (arguing that the Supreme Court has continued to 
expand the immunities for police officers). First, the Court created a two-part test in 2001 in Saucier 
v. Katz. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see Nemeth, supra note 167, at 1001 (describing the two-part 
test adopted by the Court in Saucier). First, a “threshold question” of whether, “[t]aken in the light 
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated 
a constitutional right?” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the Court determines that there was no 
constitutional violation, the inquiry into qualified immunity ends. Id. Then, if a court determines a 
police officer violated a constitutional right, the court must “ask whether the right was clearly 
established,” based on the facts of the case, “not as a broad general proposition.” Id. The Court went 
on to state that the goal of this part of the inquiry is to ensure officers may “avoid the burden of trial 
if qualified immunity is applicable.” Id. Following Saucier, in 2009, in Pearson v. Callahan, the 
Court narrowed the two-step inquiry to one step: whether, at the time of the law enforcement act, it was 
“clearly established” that the officer’s actions were unconstitutional, a standard courts struggled with 
until 2015. 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009); see Jessica R. Sarff, Qualified Immunity Not Accident-Proof, 
Official Discretion Advised: The Need to Clearly Establish the Right to Raise Qualified Immunity 
in Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 309, 316 (2014) (providing an 
overview of the Supreme Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan and demonstrating how it 
substantially narrowed the qualified immunity inquiry); Tahir Duckett, Note, Unreasonably 
Immune: Rethinking Qualified Immunity in Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 53 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV., 409, 428 (2016) (describing the inconsistent applications of the “clearly established” 
requirement following Saucier). 
169 See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (holding that the “clearly established” 
violation must be demonstrated specifically, and not “at a high level of generality”).  
170 Id.  
171 See id. (stating that “specificity” is important in these cases, and that individuals courts 
should not use generalizations to define “clearly established”); Nemeth, supra note 167, at 1011 
(stating that courts apply the qualified immunity defense even “if a mere possibility exists that the 
officer did not know they were infringing upon a constitutional right.”).  
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Mullenix, determined that qualified immunity applied because there was not 
clear precedent that defined the right asserted by the petitioner.172 Mullenix 
determines that qualified immunity protects police when the precedent is 
murky, as clear precedent is required to prove that conduct was “clearly 
established” to be unconstitutional; in close cases, therefore, the tie goes to the 
police officer.173 
Qualified immunity has virtually erased the means citizens have to hold 
officers responsible, a § 1983 claim alleging a violation of constitutional 
rights.174 Under the “clearly established” doctrine applied in Mullenix, courts 
must find precedent extremely similar to the case a citizen brings.175 This 
requirement has chilled the evolution of excessive force jurisprudence, 
protecting citizens from police only in circumstances that courts found 
warranted protection prior to the adoption of the “clearly established” 
doctrine.176 The “clearly established” doctrine is so specific that the facts of the 
cases must be nearly identical.177 In 2018 in Baxter v. Bracey, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted qualified immunity to a police officer 
after determining the alleged constitutional violation was not “clearly 
established.”178Baxter, a burglary suspect, brought a § 1983 claim after Bracey, 
a police officer, released his dog on him while he was seated and raising his 
____________________________________________________________ 
172 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309, 312.  
173 See id. at 312 (“Even accepting that these circumstances fall somewhere between the two 
sets of cases respondents discuss, qualified immunity protects in the ‘hazy border between excessive 
and acceptable force.’”) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206). Justice Sotomayor wrote a blistering 
critique of the majority decision in Mullenix. See id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice 
Sotomayor stated that the majority was “sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to 
policing…[which] renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.” Id.  
174 Amir H. Ali & Emily Clark, Qualified Immunity Explained, THE APPEAL (Jun. 20, 2019), 
https://theappeal.org/qualified-immunity-explained/ (“Qualified immunity takes away the other 
avenue that victims of police violence should have available to hold police accountable.”). Between 
2005 and 2014, U.S. police officers killed approximately 10,000 individuals; prosecutors only charged 
153, just over one percent, of officers involved in these deaths. Tom Jackman & Devlin Barrett, 
Charging Officers With Crimes is Still Difficult for Prosecutors, WASH. POST (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2020/05/29/charging-cops-with-crimes-is-still-
difficult-prosecutors/. It is difficult to prove manslaughter or murder in these cases because the 
prosecutor must show the intent of the officer. Id. Without criminal charges as a viable avenue, § 1983 
claims become even more important to hold officers responsible.  
175 See id.  
176 Id.  
177 See Baxter v. Bracey, 751 Fed.Appx. 869, 870 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied 590 U.S.___ 
(2020).  
178 Id. 
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arms in a sign of surrender.179 Even though case law established that releasing 
a canine on an individual lying down on the ground in surrender was 
unconstitutional, the Sixth Circuit granted the officer qualified 
immunity.180Baxter demonstrates just how close the facts of a case must be to 
show “clearly established” precedent – a fact as simple as sitting down, instead 
of lying down, can alter the outcome.181 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that it does not intend to reconsider the qualified immunity 
doctrine.182 In June 2020, the Court declined certiorari in at least seven 
qualified immunity cases, including Baxter.183  
____________________________________________________________ 
179 Id. at 870. Baxter suffered a bite from Iwo, the police dog, on his underarm. Id. According 
to the dog’s training, one bite was the appropriate amount to restrain a suspect. Id. Following Iwo’s 
bite, the police officers arrested Baxter. Id.  
180 Id.; Campbell v. City of Springboro, 700 F.3d 779, 784 (6th Cir. 2013). In Campbell v. City 
of Springboro, a 2013 case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, police released a 
police dog onto a criminal suspect who had “decided to lie on the ground…in an attempt to avoid a 
confrontation with the police.” 700 F.3d at 784. After reviewing the facts of the case and 
emphasizing that the suspect was “lying down with his arms at his side,” the court determined that 
the individual had clearly made an argument for excessive force, declining to grant qualified 
immunity to the police. Id. at 787; see also Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court Turns Down Cases on 
‘Qualified Immunity’ for Police, POLITICO (Jun. 15, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/15/supreme-court-qualified-immunity-police-cases-
320187 (describing the facts of Baxter and noting the seemingly strange outcome that allowed an 
individual lying down to raise a claim but applying qualified immunity to Baxter, who was sitting 
with arms raised).   
181 Compare Baxter, 751 Fed.Appx. at 870 (granting qualified immunity to a police officer who 
set his dog onto a suspect who was sitting down with hands raised in a surrender position), with 
Campbell, 700 F.3d at 787 (denying qualified immunity to officers that set a dog onto a suspect who 
was lying down in a surrender position). As one Judge stated, Qualified immunity allows officials to 
“duck consequences for bad behavior…as long as they were the first to behave badly,” which in turn 
fails to deter police behavior. Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
182 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Rejects Cases on Qualified Immunity Used to 
Shield Police Officers, ABA J. (Jun. 16, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme-
court-rejects-cases-on-qualified-immunity-used-to-shield-police-officers (recounting the Supreme 
Court’s denial of certiorari in at least seven, potentially eight, qualified immunity cases). 
183 See id. (describing the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari in the Baxter case). 
Notably, Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari 
in Baxter. See Baxter, 590 U.S.___ (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas reiterated his 
doubts regarding the Court’s qualified immunity decisions. Id. He stated he would have granted the 
writ of certiorari because the Court’s jurisprudence “appears to stray from the statutory text [of § 
1983].” Id. Justice Thomas emphasized that § 1983 does not provide for defenses, and “applies 
categorically to the deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.” Id. In his dissent, 
Justice Thomas recounted the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence, and criticized its approach 
to the doctrine. Id. Specifically, Justice Thomas criticized the Court for straying from its initial 
approach to qualified immunity, which relied upon immunities granted in the common law. Id.; see 
also Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556–57 (determining that police officers may raise a defense of good faith, 
or qualified immunity, based on the common law’s recognition of the defense). Justice Thomas 
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III. COMMONLY CITED REFORM TACTICS: WHY THEY FAIL TO CHANGE 
POLICE PRACTICES & CULTURE 
Diversity within police departments has improved over time; fifty years 
ago, the vast majority of law enforcement was white men.184 Affirmative action 
policies in the 1970s and 1980s helped to diversify departments, but many law 
enforcement departments remain majority white and male.185 Although 
diversity in police departments likely improves the culture within law 
enforcement, evidence is murky regarding the actual impact of race on police 
practices.186 Regardless of whether data clearly indicates the importance of a 
diverse police force, arguably diversifying these departments could lessen the 
“us vs. them” mentality by redefining the identity of officers.187 Furthermore, 
hiring a diverse workforce may challenge implicit biases about Black 
Americans and propensity to commit crime.188 Recruiting a diverse workforce 
of individuals “who have had positive interactions with people of various 
cultures and backgrounds” may lead to more unbiased policing; people tend to 
hold less biases against “groups with which they have had positive 
____________________________________________________________ 
would like to reshape the qualified immunity analysis to “at least…return to the approach of asking 
whether immunity ‘was historically accorded the relevant official’ in an analogous situation ‘at 
common law.’” Baxter, 590 U.S._(Thomas, J., dissenting).  
184 David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
ONLINE 25, 40–41 (2017). 
185 Id. at 41. 
186 See David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New 
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1224–25 (2006) 
[hereinafter Not Your Father’s Police Department] (suggesting that data related to race and police 
practices may not show the results many scholars would expect). Many anticipated diversity, 
particularly hiring more Black officers, would improve law enforcement relationships with diverse 
communities. Id. at 1224. Officers from racial minorities may believe that they have “special 
competencies,” such as “greater understanding of minority communities, and greater credibility in 
minority communities.” Id. Unfortunately, however, the data is largely inconclusive – some studies 
determined that Black police officers fire weapons as frequently as white peers and that Black officers 
may be just as biased against Black people as white officers, while other studies suggested that Black 
officers are more likely to receive cooperation from Black individuals and that Black officers are less 
biased against Black people. Id. 
187 Id. at 1240 (“By weakening the social solidarity of the police, the growing diversity of law 
enforcement workforces makes it more likely that departments will be able to take advantage of the 
special competencies of minority officers, female officers, and openly gay and lesbian officers.”). 
Diversifying police departments may even help facilitate additional reforms to departments, such as 
“civilian oversight, community policing, and systematic efforts to ameliorate racial bias in 
policing.” Id  
188 See Lorie A. Fridell, et al., Racially Biased Policing: The Law Enforcement Response to the 
Implicit Black-Crime Association, in RACIAL DIVIDE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 27, (Michael J. Lynch, et al. ed., 2008); see also Final Report of the President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing, supra note 143, at 17.  
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experiences.”189 Although racial diversity may have inconclusive results, there 
is significant evidence that female police officers are less likely to use force 
than male officers.190  Women officers may use policing tactics that emphasize 
communication, rather than force.191 Thus, one possible incremental reform for 
U.S. law enforcement is recruiting more women, who are less likely to use 
force than male officers.192 
Beyond recruitment, U.S. law enforcement training may be another avenue 
for reform. Germany requires its police officer recruits to attend between two 
and four years of training.193 In the United States, however, training may take 
only twenty-one weeks, with an average of 672 basic training hours to become 
a police officer.194 There are no national standards for police training, leaving 
state police commissions to determine the appropriate amount of training.195 In 
North Carolina, for example, police officers must complete 620 hours of 
training; notably, barbers in North Carolina must complete 1,528 hours to be 
____________________________________________________________ 
189 Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, supra note 143, at 17. 
190Christina Asquith, Why Aren’t U.S. Police Departments Recruiting More Women?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/police-
departments-women-officers/497963/. 
191 Id. Furthermore, female officers are more likely to write reports in response to domestic-
violence allegations than their male counterparts. Id.  
192 Drake Baer, If You Want Less Police Violence, Hire More Female Cops, THE CUT (Jul. 15, 
2016), https://www.thecut.com/2016/07/more-female-cops-less-police-violence.html. 
193 Yasmeen Serhan, What the World Could Teach America About Policing, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jun. 10, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/06/america-police-
violence-germany-georgia-
britain/612820/#:~:text=In%20Germany%2C%20for%20example%2C%20police,or%20master's
%20degree%20in%20policing. Further, in Germany, police recruits are offered the opportunity to 
study for an advanced degree, bachelor’s or master’s, focused on policing. Id. German training 
covers a wide variety of situations, with an emphasize on de-escalation. Id. Lethal force is used 
sparingly, as “the emphasis [of training] is not on using weapons or shooting.” Id.  
194 Id.; Kelly McLaughlin, The Average US Police Department Requires Fewer Hours of 
Training Than What it Takes to Become a Barber or a Plumber, INSIDER (Jun. 12, 2020), 
https://www.insider.com/some-police-academies-require-fewer-hours-of-training-plumbing-2020-
6.  Less time training may limit the amount of energy spent teaching officers how to de-escalate 
situations – as Paul Hirschfield, a professor of sociology and criminal justice, stated: “If you only 
have 21 weeks of classroom training, naturally you’re going to emphasize survival.” Serhan, supra 
note 193.   
195 See Yuri R. Linetsky, What the Police Don’t Know May Hurt Us: An Argument for 
Enhanced Legal Training of Police Officers, 48 N.M.L. REV. 1, 18 (2018) (recounting the various 
states’ requirements for police training). The range in required hours may differ substantially state to 
state – in Louisiana, officers are only required to attend 360 hours of training, while Hawaii requires 
1068 hours. Id. Of these hours, only 12.52% on average focuses on legal subjects, such as statutory 
law, criminal charges, and traffic law. Id. at 27–28. 
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licensed. 196  Police training focuses on officer safety, despite the fact that most 
police officers will never need to fire a gun during their time in law 
enforcement.197 Although weapons are clearly rarely required, police training 
features an average of 110 hours of “military-style training,” which includes 
using weapons and learning self-defense tactics.198 In contrast to the 110 hours 
of military-like training, de-escalation practices received only eight hours of 
attention during training.199 Thus, police officers enter the workforce prepared 
to use deadly force (even though they will likely never need this training), and 
grossly under-educated in de-escalation.200In addition, few police training 
regimens include implicit bias training, and in those that do, the training is 
extremely short.201 Finally, officers are typically woefully unprepared to help 
people living with mental illness.202 Although ten percent of police calls deal 
with mental illness, some states do not require officers to be trained in mental 
illness.203 Due to the lack of training in this area, many families of those with 
mental illness lack trust in the police, and do not feel comfortable calling 911 
in crisis situations.204  Perhaps instituting rigorous training regimens, like 
____________________________________________________________ 
196 Holly Yan, States Require More Training Time to Become a Barber Than a Police Officer, 
CNN (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/28/us/jobs-training-police-trnd/index.html 
197 See Cummings, supra note 18, at 607 (stating that the focus of law enforcement training is 
“returning home alive each night,” despite the reality of most officers never facing a situation 
requiring weapons).  
198 Id. During this training, officers may be “repeatedly exposed to scenarios in which 
seemingly innocuous interaction with the public, such as traffic stops, turn deadly. The endlessly 
repeated point is that any encounter can turn deadly in a split second,” encouraging officers to be 
prepared to use deadly force. Id. at 606–07. The belief that each interaction with the public may 
result in death creates a hostile environment, and encourages police to “control [citizens] rather than 
communicate with them.” Id. at 607. 
199 Id.  
200 See id. (describing the misplaced emphasis on military-esque training in police academies). 
201See id. at 591–93 (providing an example of implicit bias training at the University of Illinois). 
Although the University of Illinois’ Police Training Institute offers training on implicit biases to 
police recruits, the training is only nine hours. Id. at 591. The goal of the training is to teach police 
recruits about the impact of racial biases in police work to improve police relationships with their 
communities and lessen biased policing practices in the state. Id. at 592. 
202 See Megan Pauly, How Police Officers Are (or Aren’t) Trained in Mental Health, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/10/how-police-
officers-are-or-aren-t-trained-in-mental-health/280485/ (summarizing the lack of training police 
officers receive in mental health). 
203 Id. The amount of training officers receive for individuals with mental illness varies state-
by-state; some states, like Florida, receive forty hours of training, while others, like Alaska, have no 
training whatsoever. Id.  
204 See Rich Schapiro, Families of Mentally Ill Fear Calling Police May Turn Into Deadly 
Encounter, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/families-
mentally-ill-fear-calling-police-turn-deadly-article-1.3917552 (recounting the fears of New 
Yorkers who have family members that live with mental illness). 
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Germany’s, or increasing de-escalation, racial bias, and mental health training, 
would improve U.S. police departments. 
But additional training alone cannot fix law enforcement; even when new 
recruits receive adequate training, they will likely be told by officers in their 
departments, “I don’t care what you learned in the academy, this is how you do 
it on the street.”205 Regardless of the level of training a trainee receives, older 
officers in the department may “re-train” new recruits to fall in line with 
department practices, which may erase any improvements gained by new 
training.206 Furthermore, many police departments allow officers who have 
received multiple complaints to serve as trainers or mentors for new recruits.207 
Remember the recent case of George Floyd – two recently trained police 
officers were present when Chauvin, the trainer, suffocated Floyd.208 Chauvin 
was allowed to train new recruits even though he had at least twelve 
misconduct complaints on his record.209 These individuals then pass on these 
bad behaviors to their trainees.210 In fact, one researcher found that when new 
officers receive citizen complaints in the first two years as an officer, “it [is] 
likely that their trainers had histories of allegations filed against them.”211 Thus, 
without proper safeguards, it is unlikely that training will accomplish much for 
reform.  
Other reforms target specific practices, like chokeholds and use of 
weapons, or call for officers to wear body-cameras at all times.212 These 
____________________________________________________________ 
205 Weichselbaum, supra note 63.  
206 See id. (describing the attitude of veteran officers toward training new recruits).  
207 Id. In one 2011 DOJ report, the DOJ determined that officers who train new recruits in New 
Orleans were “unqualified and unsuitable to supervise and train recruits.” The same was found to 
be true in Cleveland, Baltimore, Chicago, and Albuquerque. Id. Derek Chauvin, the officer who 
killed George Floyd by kneeling on his neck, was a trainer even though he had accumulated 
approximately twelve complaints throughout his nineteen-year tenure as an officer in Minneapolis. 
Id. He never received discipline for his misconduct. Id 
208 See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text (summarizing the individuals involved in 
George Floyd’s death and noting that two of the officers had only been on the force for four days).  
209 Weichselbaum supra note 63. 
210 Id. (“There is a definite association between [field training officers] and their issues and the 
trainees’ later success or deviance in their careers.”).  
211 Id. 
212 See Final Report on 21st Century Policing, supra note 143, at 32 (recommending that police 
departments utilize body-cameras to reform policing in the United States); Monika Evstatieva & 
Tim Mak, How Decades of Bans on Police Chokeholds Have Fallen Short, NPR (Jun. 16, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/16/877527974/how-decades-of-bans-on-police-chokeholds-have-
fallen-short  (summarizing the history of chokehold bans in the United States and explaining the 
shortcomings of this approach). For example, since George Floyd’s death due to suffocation, 
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reforms, however, are lackluster without systems that hold officers accountable 
– without oversight, even with a body-camera, there is no real incentive to act 
appropriately. The following Part will propose reforms that include unbiased 
review systems to hold police officers accountable, deter misconduct, and build 
trust in the Black community.213 
IV. REFORMS THAT DETER 
As Justice John Paul Stevens emphasized in his dissenting opinion in 
Illinois v. Wardlow in 2000, minorities may have significant distrust of police 
officers, believing “that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart 
from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence.”214 
Justice Stevens’ observation highlights the significant distrust of police within 
the Black community – forty-eight percent of Black Americans “have very 
little or no confidence” that law enforcement treats Black and white Americans 
the same, and an additional seventeen percent of Black Americans only had 
“some” confidence in police officers to act without bias.215 Studies of social 
science have revealed that trust, defined as the citizen’s belief that “police and 
court procedures are in accord with people’s sense of a fair process,” is 
____________________________________________________________ 
Democrats in Congress have drafted legislation that would ban the use of chokeholds. Evstatieva & 
Mak, supra note 212. The 2020 legislation would also make lynching a federal crime, increase the 
requirements for data collection by law enforcement agencies, expand police training requirements, 
and incentivize police departments to incorporate body cameras into their practices. See Emily 
Cochrane & Luke Broadwater, Here are the Differences Between Senate and House Bills to 
Overhaul Policing, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Jun. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/us/politics/police-reform-bill.html (pointing out significant 
differences between two bills to reform policing, one from the Senate Republicans and one from the 
Senate Democrats). In addition, the Democrats’ bill would modify the qualified immunity doctrine, 
aim to eliminate racial profiling or biases in law enforcement, and make prosecution of officers for 
poor conduct easier. Id.  
213 See infra Part IV. 
214 528 U.S. 119, 132 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Wardlow  
v. Illinois, the Court held that unprovoked flight may be considered in the reasonable suspicion 
justification. Id. at 121 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens rejected the majority decision because 
unprovoked flight does not always reflect guilt; instead, it may reflect distrust of the police. See id. 
at 132–33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing other reasons an 
individual might flee the police, such as minority individuals’ distrust of law enforcement). 
215 Laura Santhanam, Two-Thirds of Black Americans Don’t Trust the Police to Treat Them 
Equally. Most White Americans Do., PBS NEWS HOUR (Jun. 5, 2020), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/two-thirds-of-black-americans-dont-trust-the-police-to-
treat-them-equally-most-white-americans-do. In contrast, forty-two percent of white Americans 
have “a great deal” of confidence that police will treat individuals without racial bias. Id. Overall, 
only eighteen percent of Americans polled “have very little or no confidence that police officers in 
their community treat people with different skin colors the same.” Id.  
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paramount to building better relations between communities and the police.216 
Without building trust between the Black community and law enforcement, 
reform efforts are meaningless; the best reforms, therefore, hold police 
accountable and demonstrate “fair process” to the public.217  
 President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing determined that 
when offices are wearing body-cameras, they are likely to behave better in 
interactions with the public.218 Implementing body-camera requirements are a 
step in the right direction, however, they must be paired with an accountability 
system of third-party review that works and strict rules regarding their use.219 
Officers should not be able to turn off body-cameras without facing 
repercussions, and the public and oversight body should be able to access the 
body-camera footage without delays.220  Mandatory body-cameras are only 
useful when officers know that their actions will be reviewed and misconduct 
judged by unbiased reviewers, not other police officers within their 
department.221 New training focused on de-escalation rather than force and 
____________________________________________________________ 
216 Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 811, 840 (2017) (citing TOM R. TYLER & YUEN HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW, at xiv (2002)). 
217 See id. (“We need to do more as a country to build trust so that when the next incident occurs 
that captures national attention, there is a sense that it will be handle fairly – and that it is not 
representative of the way the police and the community interact.”).  
218 Final Report on 21st Century Policing, supra note 143, at 32. The Final Report also suggests 
that the public is likely to behave better when police officers are wearing body-cameras. Id.  
219 See Lindsey Van Ness, Body Cameras May Not be the Easy Answer Everyone was Looking 
For, PEW (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/01/14/body-cameras-may-not-be-the-easy-answer-everyone-was-
looking-for (explaining that merely requiring police officers to wear body-cameras is insufficient to 
improve police practices, and instead, states should pair the requirement with specific rules for 
reviewing the footage and keeping the body-cameras turned on at pivotal moments).  
220 See Campaign Zero, Body Cams/Film the Police, CAMPAIGN ZERO (last visited Aug. 2, 
2020), https://www.joincampaignzero.org/solutions#film-the-police (offering a variety of reforms 
for body-cameras, including granting the public better access to footage); Arjeta Lajka, Reports 
Suggest Body Cameras Only Effective When Cops Can’t Turn Them Off, VICE (Mar. 25, 2015), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvagmd/reports-suggest-body-cameras-are-only-effective-
when-cops-cant-turn-them-off (explaining that body cameras are considered more effective when 
police officers do not have the discretion to decide when to turn the cameras on or off). Of note, 
some scholars argue that body-cameras need carefully crafted rules to ensure citizens’ privacy is 
protected. See e.g., Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 
68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 399–400 (2016) (highlighting the tension between body-cameras providing 
police oversight and infringing on individuals’ privacy); Ethan Thomas, Note, The Privacy Case for 
Body Cameras: The Need for a Privacy-Centric Approach to Body Camera Policymaking, 50 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 191, 195 (2017) (advocating for an approach to body-camera 
legislation that prioritizes privacy).  
221 See Van Ness, supra note 219 (suggesting that mandatory body-cameras are only effective 
when the the requirement to wear the cameras is paired with rules for the review and uses of the 
footage).  
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banning certain practices, like chokeholds, are steps in the right direction, 
however, these types of reform fail to ensure police are held accountable for 
bad acts.222 The Supreme Court’s precedent has granted police officers broad 
discretion and has offered few means to deter police and hold officers 
accountable.223 In addition, police departments themselves and unions are 
unwilling to hold the bad actors accountable.224 Reforms must focus on 
ensuring accountability, trust, and deterrence.225 There need to be neutral, 
speedy, adjudication of police malfeasance. In addition, there needs to be 
power to punish.     
This Part will offer two different ways to hold police accountable, deter 
bad acts, and rebuild trust in U.S. law enforcement.226 First, Section A will 
argue that a comprehensive police licensing and decertification scheme, 
maintained by an independent body, is the type of reform needed to deter bad 
police acts and hold police accountable; furthermore, this practice ensures that 
the public can trust that police officers have oversight, as review of bad acts 
will no longer be conducted by police officers themselves.227 Second, Section 
B will argue that District Attorneys can play a role in deterring bad acts by 
decriminalizing certain offenses, which cuts back on police and prosecutorial 
discretion, and minimizes officer interactions with the community.228 
A. Meaningful Licensing & Decertification Statutes Can Hold Police 
Accountable 
Nearly 25% of workers in the United States need a government-approved 
license, including makeup artists in thirty-six states and security guards in 
thirty-seven states, to conduct their work; this percentage is up from only 5% 
____________________________________________________________ 
222 See supra notes 184–212 and accompanying text (summarizing reforms that are steps in the 
right direction, but fail to hold police fully accountable).  
223 See supra notes 115–183 and accompanying text (providing an overview of Supreme Court 
precedent that grants police officers broad discretion and does not offer means to hold police 
accountable for bad acts). 
224 See supra notes 82–100 and accompanying text (describing the lack of accountability in 
police departments and police unions). 
225 See infra Part IV (arguing that meaningful reform requires deterrence and accountability to 
unbiased parties).  
226 See infra Part IV. 
227 See infra Part IV.A. 
228 See infra Part IV.B.  
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in the 1950s.229 The majority of states require police officers to obtain licenses 
or certifications to serve in law enforcement – in fact, only four states have no 
licensing requirement for officers.230 Since the 1960s, however, only 
approximately 30,000 officers have lost their certifications, with nearly fifty 
percent of decertification occurring in California, Florida, and Georgia.231 
Decertification relies on state statutes, and some states only allow 
decertification when an officer has committed a felony, which likely 
contributes to the low number of decertifications.232 This Article argues that 
certification statutes must be strong enough to hold police officers accountable 
and ensure that all misconduct, not just misconduct egregious enough to be 
charged in court, is brought to the review of third-parties.233 Furthermore, this 
____________________________________________________________ 
229 D. Bruce Johnsen & Adam David Marcus, Pension Forfeiture and Police Misconduct, 14 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 29 (2017); see also Business News Daily Editor, 10 Jobs You Didn’t Know 
Need Licenses, BUSINESS NEWS DAILY (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2492-
occupations-requiring-licenses.html (listing a number of surprising jobs that require state licenses). 
230 See Christopher Gavin, Mass. Lawmakers are Readying for a Police Certification System. 
Here’s What Would Make it Strong, According to Experts, BOSTON.COM (Jun. 16, 2020), 
https://www.boston.com/news/policy/2020/06/16/massachusetts-police-certification-system 
(noting that Massachusetts is one of only four states that do not require police officers to obtain a 
certification); Candice Norwood, Can States Tackle Police Misconduct With Certification Systems?, 
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/police-
misconduct-decertification/522246/ (stating that “around 44 states” have certification programs for 
police officers).  
231 Id. Although Florida has decertified around 7,000 officers, some states that decertify officers 
have decertified as few as ten since the beginning of their certification requirements. Id. New 
Mexico, in 1960, was the first state to create laws that allowed the state to decertify officers. Johnsen 
& Marcus, supra note 229, at 29.  
232 Norwood, supra note 230. Notably, some states will allow police officers charged but not 
convicted of crimes to return to the police force. See Jeffrey Benzing, In Disciplining Cops, 
Pennsylvania’s Standards Trail Other States, PUBLIC SOURCE (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.publicsource.org/in-disciplining-cops-pennsylvanias-standards-trail-other-states/ 
(explaining Pennsylvania’s standard for decertification). For example, an officer in Pennsylvania 
was accused of misconduct in the death of Antwon Rose II and charged with criminal homicide. Id. 
If the officer is convicted of criminal homicide, he will be decertified. Id. If he is not convicted, the 
officer can return to law enforcement, even though his conduct was questionable enough to warrant 
a criminal trial. Id. In Pennsylvania, misdemeanors are not grounds for decertification. Id. There are 
six states that have the power to revoke an individual’s license to be a barber, but do not have the 
power to revoke an individual’s police license. Roger L. Goldman, A Model Decertification Law, 
32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 147, 155 (2012) [hereinafter A Model Decertification Law]. 
233 See infra notes 235–251 and accompanying text (arguing that state licensing and 
decertification statutes must include key elements to be effective deterrents for police officers). 
Permanently keeping officers out of a job may be the most powerful deterrent of all; as one New 
York-based civil rights lawyer experienced, officers are not afraid of civil penalties, as departments 
often bear the monetary loss. See Joel Berger, Letter to the Editor, How to Reduce Police Brutality, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/opinion/letters/police-brutality-
george-floyd.html. In one case, an officer even told the civil rights attorney, “[g]o ahead and sue, 
the money isn’t coming out of my pocket.” Id. Perhaps the officer would not have been so cavalier 
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Article identifies two ways the federal government can play a role in 
strengthening state certification policies and procedures.234  
Most states with decertification statutes create an independent agency, 
often called the Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission (“POST”), 
that investigates officer misconduct and decides when an officer should be 
decertified or face other consequences.235 State licensing and decertification 
statutes currently vary widely.236Successful licensing statutes, one scholar 
argues, would have four primary elements: (1) the licensing body has oversight 
over police officers and other actors within the criminal justice system; (2) the 
licensing body can revoke licenses and decertify police officers for a variety of 
types of misconduct, not just criminal convictions; (3) the licensing body 
should be able to both incentivize law enforcement to report misconduct and 
reprimand law enforcement when it fails to report misconduct, and; (4) the 
licensing body may impose punishments when police departments, and more 
specifically, chiefs of police departments, fail to report misconduct.237 An 
additional element might be periodical renewals of licensing so that problems 
can be identified before they become more serious. 
The oversight of the POST or otherwise named licensing body must be 
complete and exclusive.238 Having oversight over the department grants the 
licensing body control both in establishing police licensing requirements and 
in establishing conduct worthy of decertification  – if it has control, it can also 
____________________________________________________________ 
had his job, rather than the department’s money, been on the line. See id. (suggesting that monetary 
damages to the police department are not a strong deterrent for officers). 
234 See infra notes 254–272 and accompanying text (demonstrating the role the federal 
government can play in ensuring states use strong licensing and decertification statutes).  
235 A Model Decertification Law, supra note 232, at 147.  
236 Id. at 150–53. Professor Roger Goldman has identified three different approaches to defining 
misconduct that warrants decertification. Id. at 150. First, some states decertify as a result of 
criminal convictions, with some including misdemeanors as decertifiable offenses and others only 
allowing decertification for felonies. Id. at 150–51.  Second, some states allow decertification after 
a hearing in front of an administrative law judge that finds the officer has “engaged in statutorily 
prohibited conduct.” Id. at 151. Finally, other states decertify and revoke an officer’s license when 
he or she is fired or agrees to leave a department rather than be fired. Id. at 152. The third approach, 
which Professor Goldman argues “is the least desirable,” is the narrowest, with revocation only 
resulting when the police department takes an action. Id. 
237 Id. at 149 (outlining Professor Goldman’s criteria for a strong decertification law). 
238 Id. at 150; see also supra notes 91–100 and accompanying text (describing the problem of 
police departments overseeing their own misconduct inquiries).  
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determine appropriate punishments, like decertification or suspension.239 
Furthermore, if the licensing body also has oversight of other roles within the 
criminal justice system, such as the hiring of correctional officers, campus 
safety officers, parole officers, and others, it can ensure that when a police 
officer is fired, he or she cannot merely re-enter law enforcement in another 
capacity.240Finally, when a licensing body truly has complete oversight, body-
camera reforms and chokehold bans may hold more effect; if officers know 
that a third party, as opposed to a fellow officer, will review their body-camera 
footage or illegal misconduct, these reforms may serve a greater deterrent 
effect.241  
When defining the type of conduct that can result in losing a police license, 
it is critical that the oversight body has considerable discretion to decertify for 
a variety of types of misconduct.242 As previously mentioned, some states only 
decertify officers when they commit a felony; ideally, statutes would be 
considerably broader, granting the authority to decertify when an officer 
commits certain types of misconduct or engages in patterns of problematic 
behavior, such as repeatedly targeting Black Americans in Terry stops.243 It is 
in this oversight capacity that body-cameras can be useful. When police 
officers wear body-cameras, it is less-likely that they will engage in 
____________________________________________________________ 
239 See supra notes 184–211 and accompanying text (summarizing the problematic training and 
hiring practices within law enforcement). For example, Florida’s licensing entity has stringent 
requirements for applicants to receive their police license – “candidates must clear a basic abilities 
test, graduate the police academy, and then pass a written certification examination.” Ben Grunwald 
& John Rappaport, The Wandering Officer, 129 YALE L.J. 1676, 1692–93 (2020). In addition, 
candidates in Florida must have “good moral character.” Id. at 1692. Any of the following are 
considered poor moral character in Florida, and would keep an individual from obtaining his or her 
police license:  
“committing any felony or certain misdemeanors (regardless of criminal prosecution), using 
excessive force, misusing an official position to secure a privilege or benefit, participating in 
sexual conduct while on duty, engaging in sexual harassment, making false statements during 
the job application process, subverting training and testing processes, and making false 
statements in a court proceeding.” Id. 
In Florida, the licensing body even has oversight of training, which allows it to require specific 
types of ongoing training, such as implicit biases or mental health training. Id. 
240 A Model Decertification Law, supra note 232, at 150. 
241 See Van Ness, supra note 219 (arguing that mandatory body-camera rules can be effective 
if an independent body is responsible for reviewing the footage). 
242 A Model Decertification Law, supra note 232, at 152 (“A hybrid approach, combining 
revocation for specific misconduct and more general language, is probably the best solution.”). 
243 See Norwood, supra note 230 (summarizing state decertification statutes and noting that 
some only decertify when an officer has committed a felony offense); see also A Model 
Decertification Law, supra note 232, at 152 (suggesting that decertification statutes must grant 
oversight bodies the ability to decertify for more misconduct than felonies).  
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misconduct.244 To enhance trust in law enforcement, the state’s oversight body 
should implement body-camera requirements for all officers.245 The oversight 
body must have the power to review body-camera footage, not only in the event 
of officer misconduct, but also at random intervals to ensure that officers 
consistently act appropriately.246 Granting the oversight body the power to 
review, particularly when officers may not be expecting it, ensures that officers 
will be held accountable for misconduct, and helps to build additional trust in 
the community.247 Furthermore, if the review of the footage reveals persistent 
racial bias, for example in an officer’s Terry stop practices, the oversight body 
must be able to sanction the officer.248 Finally, as suggested earlier in this 
Article, officers should be punished for breaking body-camera rules, such as 
turning off the camera when unauthorized.249 
 Even when states have comprehensive licensing and decertification 
statutes, if misconduct is covered up by police departments, the benefits of 
these third-parties may not be significant; thus, licensing bodies must have 
considerable power to (1) incentivize reporting of misconduct, (2)have the 
personnel and the power conduct investigations of police departments 
including subpoena power and (3) reprimand departments and individual 
police chiefs when misconduct is not reported.250 To ensure officers report 
____________________________________________________________ 
244 See Obama, supra note  216, at 864 (“In several research studies, body-worn cameras are 
shown to help decrease reported complaints about officers.”).  
245 See id. (suggesting that requiring police officers to wear body-cameras can increase the 
community’s trust).  
246 See id. at 865 (arguing that body-camera requirements “must be implemented…in 
cooperation with thoughtful policies, initiatives, and technological safeguards to ensure that civil 
rights are upheld, privacy interests are respected, and cameras are part of a cost-effective approach 
to transparency and public safety”).  
247 Id. at 864. 
248 See generally id. (suggesting that body-cameras can be a powerful tool in holding officers 
accountable and building trust of police in the community).  
249 See Eddy Rodriguez, Chicago Mayor Calls out Officers Who Turn Off Body Cams, Says 
‘We Will Strip You of Your Police Powers,’ NEWSWEEK (Jun. 6, 2020), 
https://www.newsweek.com/chicago-mayor-calls-out-officers-who-turn-off-body-cams-says-we-
will-strip-you-your-police-1509167 (describing a new Chicago policy that would remove officers 
from the police force who either cover their identification or turn off their body-cameras during the 
course of duty).   
250 A Model Decertification Law, supra note 232, at 153–54. For example, in Oregon, the POST 
can impose penalties as great as $1,500 upon law enforcement departments that fail to comply with 
reporting requirements. Id. at 154. Alternatively, if the failure to report is particularly egregious or 
systemic, the whole department could lose their licenses. Id. 
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misconduct, the oversight body can require officers to intervene when another 
officer is committing a bad act or risk losing their own license.251 
Ultimately, a credible and accessible reporting and reviewing system could 
result in both more citizen complaints and citizen trust in police.252 To ensure 
this positive result, the reporting and reviewing system must be widely 
disseminated to the public.253 
Although the states primarily control police departments, there are two 
important roles the federal government can play in holding law enforcement 
accountable through state licensing.254 First, the federal government should 
partner with state law enforcement to create a national registry to record all 
officers who have been decertified to ensure that officers decertified in one 
state cannot be re-hired and recertified in another state.255 Although a National 
Decertification Index already exists, data entry relies on individual POSTs 
inputting the information.256 Each POST may have different criteria for 
reporting decertification, making the National Decertification Index woefully 
____________________________________________________________ 
251 See Officers Spoke Up But Didn’t Intervene, supra note 64 (describing Minneapolis’s “duty 
to intervene” rule and noting that the City hopes to make the rule enforceable in court to hold officers 
accountable).  
252 See Campaign Zero, Community Oversight, Campaign Zero (last visited Aug. 2, 2020), 
https://www.joincampaignzero.org/solutions#oversight (suggesting that establishing review 
processes outside of law enforcement to review misconduct would better hold bad officers 
accountable). Currently, less than “1 in every 12 complaints of police misconduct nationwide results 
in some kind of disciplinary action.” Id.  
253 See id. (“For all stops by a police officer, require officers to give civilians their name, badge 
number, reason for the stop and a card with instructions for filing a complaint….”).  
254 See infra notes 255–263 and accompanying text (describing two different roles the federal 
government can play in encouraging police licensing statutes). The federal government also has the 
power to grant funding to state law enforcement to encourage strong licensing laws. Roger Goldman, 
Importance of State Law in Police Reform, 60 ST. LOUIS L.J. 363, 386–88 (2016) [hereinafter State 
Law in Police Reform]. When determining which departments to grant funding, the federal 
government should preference those that have a strong certification and decertification program, 
actively report decertified officers to the Index, and implement specific training for officers in the areas 
of mental illness, domestic violence, and racial bias. Id. at 387. This type of pressure may help to 
mitigate the reluctance of state officials to enact legislation the police unions oppose. See id. 
(suggesting that unions hold significant control over state officials, but the federal government can 
impose pressure by linking funding to strong certification statutes for police officers). Professor 
Goldman also argues that the federal government can play a larger role in accountability, as it does 
in Medicare and Medicaid. Id. If a police officer is found guilty or pleads guilty in a prosecution by 
the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, Goldman suggests that the officer should be required to notify his 
or her state licensing body. Id. at 388. Upon notification, the officer’s license would be revoked; 
this would ensure that the police officer cannot serve anywhere in law enforcement, including in 
alternative states. Id.    
255 Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, supra note 143, at 29. 
256 Id. 
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incomplete.257 If the DOJ were given funding and oversight to expand the 
National Decertification Index, as the President’s Report on 21st Century 
Policing suggests, the Index could become a valuable tool to ensure decertified 
officers are held accountable and would ensure certification policies for police 
mirrors “the way states’ licensing laws treat other professionals” because “the 
need for such a system is even more important for law enforcement, as officers 
have the power to make arrests, perform searches, and use deadly force.”258 
Second, the federal government can act as a second line of defense; if 
police departments fail to comply with the licensing body’s requirements (or 
sanctions for misconduct), the licensing body should refer the case to the 
Department of Justice.259 Under the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, the federal government has the power to investigate 
and take legal action against police departments that repeatedly use practices 
that violate individuals’ constitutional rights.260 Through this statute, the 
Attorney General can investigate law enforcement practices in the offending 
jurisdiction, and may pursue “equitable and declaratory relief,” via court order 
or consent decree.261Often, police departments avoid litigation in favor of 
consent decrees, which require the department to commit to specific practices, 
such as training, for a set period of time to reform the department.262 In the 
____________________________________________________________ 
257 Id. In addition, the National Decertification Index is not publicly available; instead, each 
POST has the power to give hiring departments access to the Index to screen new hires. Id.  
258 Id. (quoting Roger L. Goldman, “Police Officer Decertification: Promoting Police 
Professionalism through State Licensing and the National Decertification Index,” Police Chief 81 
(November 2014): 40–41). Furthermore, a national Index could help solve the problem of the 
“wandering officer,” law enforcement officers “who are fired or who resign under threat of 
termination and later find work in law enforcement somewhere else.” Grunwald & Rappaport, supra 
note 239, at 1682. A national index of decertified officers could help to mitigate this problem, but 
only if it is sufficiently complete. Id. at 1688. 
259 See Ayesha Bell Hardaway, Time is Not on Our Side: Why Specious Claims of Collective 
Bargaining Rights Should Not Be Allowed to Delay Police Reform Efforts, 15 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & 
CIV. LIBERTIES 137, 141–42 (2019) (describing the role the federal government can play in issuing 
consent decrees).  
260 Id.; see also 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2017) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C. § 14141).  
261 See Hardaway, supra note 259, at 153 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 12601).  
262 Id. For example, after the DOJ filed a civil lawsuit against the Los Angeles Police 
Department (“LAPD”) stating that the LAPD was “engaging in a pattern or practice of excessive 
force, false arrests and unreasonable searches and seizure” in 2000, the LAPD entered into a consent 
decree to avoid going to trial. Los Angeles Police Department, Civil Rights Consent Decree, L.A. 
POLICE DEP’T (last visited Jul. 12, 2020), 
http://www.lapdonline.org/search_results/content_basic_view/928. The consent decree included a 
number of different provisions, including “management and supervisory measures to promote Civil 
Rights Integrity; Critical incident procedures, documentation, investigation and review; 
Management of Gang Units; Management of Confidential Informants; Program development for 
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event that a police department fails to comply with the state licensing body’s 
requirements, the entity should have the power to refer the police department 
to the Department of Justice for investigation.263 
Different administrations have pursued consent decrees with varying levels 
of enthusiasm.264 The Obama Administration took an aggressive stance, 
investigating twenty-five police departments.265 For example, following 
Michael Brown’s death at the hands of police in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014, 
the Department of Justice entered into a consent decree with the City of 
Ferguson to implement significant changes in the Ferguson Police 
Department’s policies.266 Following an investigation of the police department, 
the Department of Justice identified “a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct 
within the [Ferguson Police Department] in violation of the First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments,” including the use of excessive force, discrimination 
against Black Americans, and more.267 To avoid litigation, in 2016, the City of 
Ferguson agreed to a 121 page consent decree that included a variety of 
requirements, including: strengthening relations between law enforcement and 
____________________________________________________________ 
response to persons with mental illness; Training” and more. Id. Furthermore, after a judge approves 
the consent decree, he or she will appoint an independent supervisor to ensure the department abides 
by the rules, which provides needed accountability. See Ian Millhiser, Trump’s Justice Department 
has a Powerful Tool to Fight Police Abuse. It Refuses to use it., Vox (Jun. 30, 2020), 
https://www.vox.com/2020/6/30/21281041/trump-justice-department-consent-decrees-jeff-
sessions-police-violence-abuse. 
263 Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has undercut the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act. See Millhiser, supra note 262 (summarizing the Trump Administration’s refusal 
to utilize consent decrees to reform policing). During the Obama Administration, the Department 
of Justice obtained fourteen consent decrees to reform police departments; the Trump 
Administration has pursued zero. Id. Although few police departments may ever face a consent 
decree, these agreements “set a tone, established best practices and put police leaders on notice.” 
Shaila Dewan & Mike Baker, Rage and Promises Followed Ferguson but Little Changed, N.Y. 
TIMES (last updated Jun. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/13/us/unrest-ferguson-
police-reform.html. As former Department of Justice Official Christy Lopez stated: “There is 
something irreplaceable about the leadership of the federal government and Department of Justice.” 
Id. 
264 See Millhiser, supra note 262 (comparing the Obama Administration’s aggressive use of 
consent decrees to reign in rogue police departments with the Trump Administration’s refusal to 
hold police departments accountable).  
265 Brianna Hathaway, A Necessary Expansion of State Power: A “Pattern or Practice” of 
Failed Accountability, 44 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 61, 87 (2019). 
266 See Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement 
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 857–67 (2016) (summarizing 
Michael Brown’s death, the DOJ’s investigation, and the resulting consent decree).  
267 Patel, supra note 266, at 861–62; see also Consent Decree, United States v. Ferguson, 4:16-
cv-00180-CDP3 (E.D. Mo., Mar. 17, 2016), at 2 [hereinafter Ferguson Consent Decree] (noting that 
the DOJ’s report found significant misconduct). 
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the community, implementing new training, requiring “bias-free policing,” 
reforming use of force reporting, and more.268 Since 2016, Ferguson has made 
“substantial progress” in implementing the consent decree’s requirements, 
including hiring a “consent decree coordinator.”269  
In contrast to the Obama Administration’s commitment to bringing actions 
to reform police departments across the United States, the Trump 
Administration has refused to use its power under Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to reform police departments.270 The federal 
government’s resistance to investigating police department misconduct is yet 
another example of the failure to deter police.271 Hopefully future 
administrations will reflect the Obama Administration’s commitment to 
reform, rather than the Trump Administration’s abdication of duty. In addition 
Congress should consider expanding the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 and make the DOJ investigations mandatory and 
provide for a large number of situations that will trigger the mandatory 
investigations. 
B. The Role of the District Attorney in Deterring Police Misconduct 
____________________________________________________________ 
268 See generally Ferguson Consent Decree (summarizing the variety of requirement under the 
DOJ’s consent decree).  
269 Valerie Schremp Hahn, Work Continues on Ferguson Consent Decree, Despite Pandemic 
and Protests, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jun. 5, 2020), 
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/work-continues-on-ferguson-consent-
decree-despite-pandemic-and-protests/article_d09e3f59-77d1-5adb-8da2-eff720b6a016.html. 
Other consent decrees, like Chicago’s, have had strong results; in Chicago, incidents involving the 
use of force decreased from 2015 to 2019 and “shootings decreased by almost half.” Dewan & 
Baker, supra note 263.  
270 Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, State Attorneys General as Agents of Police Reform, 69 
DUKE L.J. 999, 1006 (2020) (describing the Trump Administration’s explicit statement that it would 
not pursue police reform under the federal statute). Notably, the commitment to pursuing consent 
decrees is largely a political ideological split – Democratic administrations are responsible for more 
than 70% of all law enforcement investigations under the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994. Hathaway, supra note 265, at 87. 
271 See Jeremy Stahl, How the Trump Administration Undid Obama’s Response to Ferguson, 
SLATE (Jun. 2, 2020), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/trump-doj-obama-policing-
reform.html (arguing that the Trump Administration’s refusal to investigate police departments 
encourages bad police behavior and fails to deter misconduct). Not only has the Trump 
Administration refused to pursue consent decrees, but it also has rolled back other Obama 
Administration attempts to reign in police. Id. For example, the Trump Administration has reversed 
limits the Obama Administration placed on the sharing of military equipment with police 
departments. Id.  
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District attorneys can play a significant role in deterring the police and 
implementing change in communities.272 Unfortunately, the close relationship 
between prosecutor offices and law enforcement may discourage prosecutors 
from bringing criminal charges against police officers.273  
Although prosecutors are unlikely to bring criminal charges against police 
officers, today progressive prosecutors are implementing reforms that cutback 
police officers’ discretion and reduce interactions with the public.274 The goal 
of these practitioners is to use the power inherent in the role of the prosecutor 
to dismantle mass incarceration and reform the criminal justice system.275 A 
number of cities have elected progressive prosecutors, including Boston, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.276 The effect of these prosecutors 
could be widespread – if 150 of the biggest prosecutor offices in the United 
States elected progressive prosecutors, reforms would reach and impact more 
than 50% of the U.S. population.277 District attorneys can decriminalize or 
choose not to prosecute certain types of conduct, which significantly cuts back 
on police presence in communities and police interactions with citizens.278 
____________________________________________________________ 
272 See generally Sklansky, supra note 184 (offering guidelines for newly-elected prosecutors 
aiming to make positive change in their communities). 
273 See CASSIDY, supra note 101, at 2 (suggesting that special prosecutors may be necessary to 
avoid conflicts of interest in prosecutions of police officers). Appointing a special prosecutor may 
ensure that he prosecution is fair, as local prosecutors offices typically have a close working 
relationship with the local law enforcement office. Id. Notably, Massachusetts proposed a new 
measure, which would allow the Attorney General’s office to handle criminal cases of misconduct. 
John R. Ellement & Matt Sout, In Major Shift, Mass. AG’s Office Would Get New Role in Police 
Deadly Force Investigations Under House Reform Bill, BOS. GLOBE (Jul. 20, 2020), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/07/20/metro/major-shift-attorney-generals-office-would-get-
new-role-police-deadly-force-investigations-under-house-reform-bill/. The goal of this legislation 
is to take the role of investigator out of district attorney offices, which frequently have close ties 
with the officers who are under investigation. Id.  
274 Although, there are a number of definitions for “progressive prosecutors,” the term typically 
refers to prosecutors that aim to implement practices to decrease the punitive nature of the U.S. criminal 
justice system. Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 
1537, 1541 (2020). In fact, both Democrats and Republicans have been labeled “progressive 
prosecutors” in the past. Id. 
275 Id. at 1542. The prosecutorial reform movement has aimed to (1) find appropriate, 
progressive individuals to challenge incumbent prosecutors in state district attorney elections, and 
(2) ensure donations are used to support progressive district attorney candidates. Id. The progressive 
prosecutor movement represents a shift from “tough-on-crime” rhetoric and rethinks the role 
prosecutors should play in the criminal justice system. Id. at 1542–43. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 1547. 
278See The Harvard Law Review Association, Note, The Paradox of “Progressive 
Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 752 (2018) [hereinafter The Paradox of “Progressive 
Prosecution”] (describing prosecutors’ discretion to decriminalize, or not enforce, certain crimes).  
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Often prosecutors decriminalize conduct considered a part of “Broken 
Windows policing,” a style of policing that led to “the criminalization and over-
policing of communities of color” by criminalizing public alcohol 
consumption, jaywalking, spitting, loitering, trespassing, possession of 
marijuana, and other crimes that do not put the public in danger.279 By 
decriminalizing these behaviors, prosecutors can minimize the presence of 
police in minority communities and decrease police discretion to arrest or stop-
and-frisk on suspicion of minor crimes or nonviolent behavior.280  
Following his election to Philadelphia District Attorney in 2017, former 
civil rights attorney Larry Krasner released a memo outlining a number of low-
level offenses that his office would no longer prosecute.281 The memo requires 
the prosecutors to (1) “decline certain charges,” such as marijuana possession 
or low-level prostitution, (2) reduce the level of charges from felony to 
misdemeanor in theft cases, (3) “divert” cases more frequently, (4) grow “re-
entry programs” in Philadelphia, (5) lessen requirements in plea agreements, 
and (6) state the pros and cons of the suggested sentence for crimes at 
sentencing.282 In addition, the memo requires “supervisory approval” when an 
assistant district attorney wants to bring a charge that is not aligned with the 
policies.283 
____________________________________________________________ 
279 Campaign Zero, End Broken Windows Policing, CAMPAIGN ZERO (last visited Aug. 4, 
2020), https://www.joincampaignzero.org/solutions#solutionsoverview. Notably, in 2018, just 5% 
of arrests in the United States were related to violent crimes, suggesting a significant volume of 
arrests are for conduct related to broken windows policing. Id.  
280 See id. (arguing that decriminalization of petty crime will reduce police presence in minority 
communities).  
281 See Shaun King, Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner Promised a Criminal Justice Revolution. 
He’s Exceeding Expectations, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/03/20/larry-krasner-philadelphia-da/ (summarizing District Attorney 
Larry Krasner’s progressive policies aimed at decreasing mass incarceration and “bring balance 
back to sentencing.”).  
282 Memorandum from District Attorney Larry Krasner to Philadelphia Assistant District 
Attorneys (February 15, 2018) [hereinafter Memorandum From D.A. Krasner]. Notably, District 
Attorney Rachael Rollins released a similar memorandum to the Suffolk County, Massachusetts 
District Attorneys’ Office in 2019. See Memorandum from District Attorney Rachael Rollins to 
Suffolk County Assistant District Attorneys (March 25, 2019) [hereinafter The Rachael Rollins 
Policy Memo]. Like District Attorney Krasner, District Attorney Rollins aimed to stop charging 
certain crimes and reform sentencing. Id. In addition, her memo emphasized the importance of cash 
bail reform and mitigating harsh immigration consequences for low-level crimes. Id.  
283 Id. “Supervisory approval” requires assistant district attorneys to receive approval from their 
supervisor and subsequently, the supervisor must receive approval from either District Attorney 
Krasner or First Assistants to the District Attorney. Id.  
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These practices serve two important purposes. First, as stated in District 
Attorney Krasner’s memo, these reforms aim to lessen mass incarceration, 
which disproportionately has effected communities of color.284 Second, and 
arguably even more important, these policies remove prosecutorial and police 
discretion.285 Today, prosecutors hold significant discretion when determining 
what charges to bring and who to bring charges against.286 Thus, prosecutors 
can eliminate classes of crimes that disproportionately impact certain 
communities, which means police officers will be deterred from pursuing these 
types of crimes and lack the discretion to determine who to charge.287 As a 
result of the decriminalization of certain crimes, police officers have less reason 
to stop individuals, decreasing the opportunities for misconduct, and building 
trust in law enforcement.288  
CONCLUSION 
 Systemic racism, which permeates every aspect of U.S. society, is 
engrained in law enforcement. This systemic racism has fostered distrust of law 
enforcement in Black communities. Although additional oversight of police 
officers through strong, meaningful licensing and de-licensing statutes will not 
alone solve systemic racism in police departments, it is a step towards 
rebuilding trust in law enforcement. Implementing neutral review processes 
____________________________________________________________ 
284 See Memorandum From D.A. Krasner, supra (stating “[t]hese policies are an effort to end 
mass incarceration and bring balance back to sentencing”). See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 
3 (providing a detailed overview of the disproportionate impact mass incarceration has had on 
communities of color, and in particular, Black communities). 
285 See infra notes 286–287 and accompanying text.  
286 See Olwyn Conway, “How Can I Reconcile With You When Your Foot is on my Neck?”: 
The Role of Justice in the Pursuit of Truth and Reconciliation, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1349, 1393 
(2018) (“The American prosecutor today has the power to shift the decision-making framework of 
the criminal system from retributive to restorative without a single legislative act”). 
287 See id. at 1393–94 (describing the impact district attorneys can have on what charges police 
investigate and what charges assistant district attorneys can bring to trial); see also The Rachael 
Rollins Policy Memo, supra note 282, at 26 (noting that the crimes decriminalized under District 
Attorney Rollins are “commonly driven by poverty, substance use disorder, mental health issues, 
trauma histories, housing or food insecurity, and other social problems rather than specific malicious 
intent”).  
288 See Obama, supra note 216, at 843–44 (suggesting that the certain crimes criminalize 
nothing but poverty, and “destroy trust, deprive our fellow Americans of fundamental rights, and 
have too often led to a two-tiered system in which the poor are not accorded the equal protection 
under the laws to which they are entitled under the U.S. Constitution”). President Obama highlighted 
the Department of Justice’s findings in Ferguson. Id. There, crime was seen as a way to increase 
city funding: “[t]he city used its justice system as a cash register.” Id. Furthermore, the majority of 
fines were levied against Black members of the Ferguson community. Id  
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that grant considerable power to oversight bodies will help to increase 
communities’ trust in law enforcement by holding officers accountable for 
misconduct and ensuring unbiased review of bad acts. 
Ultimately, meaningful police reform that deters police requires more 
than a simple ban on certain practices or new training regimens. Since George 
Floyd’s tragic death, there have been some reforms of police practices. This 
provides some hope for greater political will in the future. Thus far the 
accountability measures are still lacking.289 Hopefully, future police reforms, 
290will include strong licensing laws, that holds officers accountable and help 
to rebuild the centuries-old distrust of law enforcement in Black communities. 
No one reform can cure systemic racism, but at the very least, it is critical to 
permanently remove bad officers from the system.  
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289 Ian Prasad Phillbrick & Sanam Yar, What Has Changed Since George Floyd, N.Y TIMES: 
THE MORNING NEWSLETTER (Aug. 3, 2020), https://messaging-custom-
newsletters.nytimes.com/template/oakv2?campaign_id=9&emc=edit_nn_20200803&instance_id=
20930&nl=the-
morning&productCode=NN%C2%AEi_id=11106884&segment_id=35086&te=1&uri=nyt%3A%
2F%2Fnewsletter%2Ffb23b07d-d4cc-5dac-9c4c-
564ed1e5ce86&user_id=1fd6c1b3f52f12c9c95cac92e46c0dea. From March 2020 to August 2020, 
31 of the 100 biggest cities in the United States have introduced new restrictions for the use of 
chokeholds, increasing the number of cities restricting the use of chokeholds to 62. Id. In addition, 
prior to the death of George Floyd, only 51 cities had policies that required police officers to 
intervene when another officer uses excessive force – in August 2020, 69 cities have this 
requirement. Id. These policies are a step forward, however, accountability systems must be 
implemented. Id. As one activist stated, “One of the key challenges moving forward will be, now 
that these standards have been raised, how are we making sure officers who violate them are held 
accountable?” Id.  
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